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ARRESTS AS GUILT 
Anna Roberts* 
An arrest puts a halt to one’s free life and may act as prelude to a new process. That new process—
prosecution—may culminate in a finding of guilt. But arrest and guilt—concepts that are factually and 
legally distinct—frequently seem to be fused together. This fusion appears in many of the consequences 
of arrest, including the use of arrests in assessing “risk,” in calculating “recidivism,” and in identifying 
“offenders.” An examination of this fusion elucidates obstacles to key aspects of criminal justice reform. 
Efforts at reform, whether focused on prosecution or defense, police or bail, require a robust understand-
ing of the differences between arrest and guilt; if they run counter to an implicit fusion of the two, they 
will inevitably falter. 
INTRODUCTION 
Approximately eleven million arrests are made in this country per year.1 
Some arrests lead to prosecutions, some do not;2 some prosecutions lead to 
convictions, some do not.3 Some arrests—let us assume—correspond to 
crime commission, some do not.4 Thus, an arrest does not connote legal guilt 
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1.  See 2016 Crime in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-18 (last visited Mar. 13, 
2019). 
2.  Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (“[I]n 
a number of large jurisdictions, the majority of criminal cases at the state level, both misdemeanors and 
felonies, are dismissed without prosecution.”). 
3.  See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 649 
(2014) (“Approximately half of misdemeanor case dispositions in 2012 were convictions.”); Sandra G. 
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 562 (2018) (“One-third of arrests lead to dismissal or 
acquittal.”). 
4.  See infra Subpart I.A. 
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or factual guilt, nor is it supposed to. It is supposed merely to be supported by 
“probable cause,” a standard that is relatively low5 and that does not require 
an adjudication of guilt.6 This standard is applied on the assumption that 
things like exculpatory information and defenses are for a later time.7 
And yet, in a wide range of ways, in a wide range of contexts, and in the 
assumptions of a wide range of people, arrests appear to be fused with guilt. 
The stage that is supposed to lie between arrest and adjudication—that period 
of diligent investigation, zealous representation, exploration of defenses, and 
possible dismissal—has too often collapsed in our implicit, and sometimes 
explicit, understandings of the criminal legal system. This fusion appears in 
consequences of arrest; discussions of “recidivism” and assessments of “risk” 
that seem to treat an arrest as equivalent to guilt; and linguistic and statistical 
“slips” that confuse “offenders” with arrestees and “crimes” with alleged 
crimes. 
Given the many differences—factual and legal—between arrest and guilt, 
such a fusion demands explanation and critique. In addition, its potential con-
sequences need to be identified and resisted. 
Part I lays out key ways in which arrests are distinct from guilt, whether 
factual guilt (commission of the crime charged) or legal guilt (conviction for 
the crime charged). Part II identifies a number of manifestations of an appar-
ent fusion of arrest and guilt. Part III explores how the fusion of arrest and 
guilt might have come about, discussing the influences of plea-bargaining, 
diversionary programs, and media, as well as the desire to comfort ourselves 
that our criminal legal system makes sense and does justice—or at least isn’t 
unjust nonsense. 
Part IV identifies one crucial set of reasons why such a fusion matters. Vi-
tal reform of the criminal legal system relies on a robust understanding of the 
 
5.  See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 680–81 
(“Probable cause is little more than heightened suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to screen 
out individuals who are factually not guilty.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 
1349 (2012) (describing probable cause as “a standard which demands less than a preponderance of the 
evidence, and which ‘means less than evidence which would justify condemnation’” (quoting Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983))); id. (“[A]n innocent person can be legally arrested, sail through the weak 
screening processes of the prosecutorial and public defender offices, go to jail, and succumb to the pressure 
to plead guilty, all based on no more than a probability (less than a fifty-fifty chance) of guilt. It is precisely 
by rolling back the evidentiary checking mechanisms which ensure both accuracy and transparency that the 
system effectively permits criminal convictions on such thin bases.”); William Ortman, Probable Cause Revisit-
ed, 68 STAN. L. REV. 511, 559 (2016) (“Probable cause to arrest . . . ’ does not require the fine resolution of 
conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands.’ While some states use a 
stricter formulation of probable cause, many others accord with federal law. When a 1981 survey of judges 
asked respondents to reduce ‘probable cause’ to a specific probability, moreover, the average was 45.78%.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975))). 
6.  See Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989); Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1349 (describ-
ing the probable cause standard as requiring “less than a fifty-fifty chance[] of guilt”). 
7.  See Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting the idea that “an officer must 
have proof of each element of a crime and negate any defense before an arrest”). 
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difference between arrest and guilt. If this distinction has indeed collapsed, 
even for those committed to criminal justice reform, an array of perhaps oth-
erwise puzzling failures of reform—in areas that include defense representa-
tion, prosecutorial conduct, police conduct, and preadjudication suffering—
may make more sense. Exposing this fusion is a necessary first step toward a 
new stage of reform.8 
I. ARRESTS ≠ GUILT 
Whether one is concerned primarily with “factual guilt” or with “legal 
guilt,” an arrest is, of course, quite distinct from guilt. While definitions of 
both “factual” and “legal” guilt are myriad,9 this Part lays out a working defi-
nition of each, before discussing the multiple ways in which each differs from 
arrest. 
A. Arrests ≠ Factual Guilt 
While alternative definitions will be discussed below,10 this Article de-
scribes someone as “factually guilty” regarding Crime X if she committed 
Crime X.11 In other words, to be factually guilty of Crime X, each of the ele-
ments of Crime X must be satisfied (including actus reus and mens rea require-
ments), and there must be no defense that negates guilt.12 While selecting this 
definition removes some complications,13 it leaves one large one. Since there 
is sometimes no definitive answer to the question “Did she commit the 
crime?”, it will sometimes be impossible to resolve the question of factual 
guilt.14 For example, there may be no definitive answer to the question of 
 
8.  For scholarly neglect of arrests, see Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 814 
(2015) (noting that arrests “remain surprisingly understudied”). 
9.  See David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 44 (1984) 
(describing the distinction as “a very controversial one”). 
10.  See infra Subpart III.C. 
11.  See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for 
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 362 n.28 (1991) (“[T]he term ‘guilty’ is used to denote both individu-
als who have committed a crime, whether or not they are convicted—this is ‘factual guilt’—and those who 
are convicted of a crime, even if they did not in fact commit the crime—‘legal guilt.’”). 
12.  See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 9, at 44 (“For me, factual guilt embraces the questions whether the 
accused committed the acts with which he is charged and whether he committed them with the requisite 
mens rea and without legal justification.”). 
13.  See infra Part I.B. 
14.  Or, as John Mitchell puts it, “[t]here are cases where factual and legal guilt merge. You may 
know all the facts in a self-defense case, but whether the defendant was ‘reasonable’ or not in employing 
the force he did will be a conclusion of the trier of fact. On the other hand, whether he was ‘reasonable’ 
will be central to the question of his factual guilt.” The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney–New Answers to 
Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297 n.12 (1980); see also Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American 
Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 130 (1987) (“[T]he kind of historical fact with 
which the law is concerned may not even exist in any meaningful way independent of the method of 
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whether someone was “reasonable” in using force in self-defense.15 This cave-
at does not alter the fact that there are several reasons why an arrest does not 
equal factual guilt. 
First, an arrest is at its core a governmental act, rather than the act of a 
suspect;16 its occurrence, therefore, cannot in and of itself establish that a sus-
pect is guilty of anything.17 (Of course, an arrest is generally claimed to be 
made in response to a suspect’s act, but that is a different thing.) While this point 
may seem obvious, that it needs to be made is suggested by the many con-
texts—discussed below18—in which an arrest is portrayed as the act of a sus-
pect. 
Second, even if we view an arrest as a response to a suspect’s alleged act, 
an act is rarely sufficient to establish factual guilt.19 Recall that factual guilt is 
defined here as commission of a crime, and recall that in our legal system 
crimes generally require, in addition to particular acts (or omissions), other 
elements such as mental states,20 and also require the absence of successful 
defenses. An arrest may speak to law enforcement’s assertion vis-à-vis an al-
leged act (and allegations about alleged acts may suffice to establish probable 
cause),21 but that falls far short of a demonstration of factual guilt.22 
 
proof.”); id. at 133 (“[T]here is no truth regarding criminal liability independent of the truth determined at 
trial, and trials are more truth-producing than truth-finding events.”); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 44 (“[S]uch 
matters as state of mind are so subjective and ephemeral that it is hard to speak of a reality distinct from the 
finding of the trier of fact.”); Note, Costs and the Plea Bargaining Process: Reducing the Price of Justice to the Nonindi-
gent Defendant, 89 YALE L.J. 333, 348 n.85 (1979) (“Frequently it is impossible for either the defendant or his 
lawyer to know before the trial whether the defendant’s actions fit the elements of the crime. For such a 
defendant the concepts of factual and legal guilt tend to merge and the objective truth exists only as it 
emerges from the fact-determining process at trial.” (citation omitted)). 
15.  See Jenny E. Carroll, Graffiti, Speech, and Crime, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1342–43 (2019). 
16.  See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 94 (2017) (“Arrest is an 
action taken by police officers under authority of the state.”). 
17.  See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 3, at 630 (“We can never directly interpret arrest rates as an 
index of underlying criminal behavior because reporting and police practices mediate criminal events and 
arrests.”). 
18.  See infra notes 124–42 and accompanying text. 
19.  See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948) (“Arrest without more does not, in 
law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or impair the credibility of a witness. It happens to the 
innocent as well as the guilty.”). 
20.  See Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 1052 
(2013) (mentioning the mens rea requirement that exists “in all but a handful of cases”). 
21.  See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Dismissals as Teachable Moments (and Databases) for the Police, 86 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (2018) (“Police observe what they believe is criminal conduct, and the 
officers make the decision on the spot whether to arrest the individual.”). 
22.  See Marks v. Carmody, 234 F.3d 1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Issues of mental state and credibil-
ity are for judges and juries [and not police officers] to decide.”) (first citing Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 
717, 725 (7th Cir. 1999); and then citing Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994)); Tillman v. 
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 695 A.2d 94, 95–97 (D.C. 1997); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1161 (2008) (“Petty charges often stem from police observation of supposed crime, 
not police investigation of crime reports. If the defendant is innocent, it is frequently because the police 
saw something and wrongly assumed that it was criminal.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1161 n.224 (“Tres-
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Third, factors other than a belief in guilt incentivize police officers to ar-
rest.23 Law enforcement officers may experience pressure—external and/or 
internal—to increase the volume of their arrests for job advancement (or job 
preservation).24 Arrests can also bring other financial benefits, whether by al-
lowing officers to claim overtime pay25 or to seize property by means of civil 
forfeiture,26 or by increasing agency revenue.27 In addition, arrests may offer a 
 
passing is the clearest example. Usually, if the defendant is innocent, it is because she had permission to be 
at the location, not because another individual trespassed.”). 
23.  See Alicia M. Hilton, Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule After Hudson v. Michigan: Preventing and 
Remedying Police Misconduct, 53 VILL. L. REV. 47, 70–71 (2008); K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 293 (2014) (“The 
pressure on police to exercise discretion to make arrests for minor offenses, such as enjoying a beer on 
one’s own stoop on a summer evening, has significantly increased the number of individuals in the lower 
criminal courts that the public might deem to be normatively innocent.”); id. at 318 n.181 (discussing pres-
sures on police to meet quotas). 
24.  See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 1532 (“[P]olice sometimes make warrantless arrests for their 
own benefit. Police departments track arrest statistics to prevent officers from ducking work and wasting 
their shifts. Officers therefore might arrest an individual to improve their arrest numbers.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
25.  See id. at 1532–33 (“[I]n some jurisdictions, because police officers are paid overtime for appear-
ing in court, they have an incentive to make arrests that will lead to court pay. One prosecutor (who wished 
to remain anonymous) explained that some police officers are more prone to arrest if they think they will be 
paid overtime to testify in court, even if the case is weak.” (footnote omitted)); Rachel A. Harmon, Why 
Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 360 (2016) (stating that police departments “use arrest numbers as a meas-
ure of productivity and a basis for overtime pay”). 
26.  See Jain, supra note 8, at 819 (“Arrests can . . . give police officers the opportunity to respond to 
incentives that have little to do with crime control—such as seizing property through civil forfeiture laws or 
responding to arrest quotas.”). Note that forfeiture can occur even when there has been no arrest, see Scott 
Rodd, Should Police Be Allowed to Keep Property Without a Criminal Conviction?, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 8, 
2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/02/08/should-police-be 
-allowed-to-keep-property-without-a-criminal-conviction, but an accusation of criminal wrongdoing may 
serve to justify such forfeiture, see Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of 
Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 289–90 (2017). 
27.  See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(observing that many states, and the federal government, allow law enforcement to keep 100% of the value 
of forfeited property); Karena Rahall, The Green to Blue Pipeline: Defense Contractors and the Police Industrial Com-
plex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1800 n.103 (2015) (stating that certain federal grants were awarded to 
police departments “based entirely on the number of drug arrests made by each department and drug ar-
rests skyrocketed as a result”); Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why-police-officers-lie-under-oath.html 
(“In the war on drugs, federal grant programs like the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
Program have encouraged state and local law enforcement agencies to boost drug arrests in order to com-
pete for millions of dollars in funding. Agencies receive cash rewards for arresting high numbers of people 
for drug offenses, no matter how minor the offenses or how weak the evidence.”); Derek Draplin & 
Kahryn Riley, Opinion, ‘Innocent Until Proven Guilty’ Should Mean What it Says, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/03/10/civil-asset-forfeiture-michigan-police-column/985 
22526/ (noting, regarding civil asset forfeiture, that “[m]ost states allow law enforcement to keep at least 
45% of the value of forfeited property, while in Michigan police get to keep up to 100%”); Shelby Grad, 
Ferguson, Mo.’s, Alleged Revenue Scams Echo in Southeast L.A. County, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015, 9:11 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ferguson-missouri-abuses-echo-southeast-los-angeles-cou 
nty-20150305-story.html (describing the Ferguson Police Department’s use of arrests as a “revenue-
generating scheme”). 
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way to control a situation,28 conduct searches,29 give new recruits experience 
and training,30 or collect pedigree information for future investigations.31 Per-
haps, one might respond, these incentives exist but have no impact; after all, 
for them actually to bring about arrests might require police officers to lie. 
Unfortunately, however, it does appear that police officers sometimes lie,32 
even or especially about important things like probable cause,33 and that such 
lies may be encouraged or enabled by the work environment,34 and legal sys-
tem,35 in which they operate. A police statement can be sufficient support for 
an arrest; evidence of police falsity helps to undermine the notion that an ar-
rest establishes factual guilt. 
Finally, while it is impossible to quantify the number of people who have 
been arrested in the absence of factual guilt, we know that there are at least 
some.36 We also know that many arrests do not lead to convictions.37 Indeed, 
 
28.  See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1701 (2010) (“[T]he officer may have made the arrest only to further some control 
objective. (In which case, the officer already may have extracted the full value of the arrest once the arrestee 
has been processed fully through central booking.)” (footnote omitted)). 
29.  See id. at 1694–95. 
30.  See id. at 1695. 
31.  See id. 
32.  See Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1348 (1994) (cataloging multiple 
reasons why the problem persists); Julian Darwall & Martin Guggenheim, Funding the People’s Right, 15 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 619, 637 (2012) (“Articles, studies, legal decisions, and investigative com-
missions have detailed problems of police misconduct and falsifications. . . . Police officers frame suspects 
by planting drugs on them or fabricating evidence; assault individuals and then cover their crimes by arrest-
ing the victims and falsely accusing them of crimes; and arrange to have evidence falsified in crime labora-
tories.”); Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Re-
ports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 12–17 (1993) (cataloging multiple kinds of police lies); Andrew J. McClurg, 
Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 417 
(1999) (“American law is rife with examples of criminal injustice attributable to police falsification.”). Note 
that police perjury happens often enough that the phenomenon has its own name: testilying. See, e.g., Kate 
Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 763 (2016). 
33.  See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 32, at 16 & n.73; Alexander, supra note 27; Peter Keane, Opinion, Why 
Cops Lie, SFGATE (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Why-cops-lie-23 
88737.php (“Police officer perjury in court to justify illegal dope searches is commonplace. One of the dirty 
little not-so-secret secrets of the criminal justice system is undercover narcotics officers intentionally lying 
under oath. It is a perversion of the American justice system that strikes directly at the rule of law. Yet it is 
the routine way of doing business in courtrooms everywhere in America.”). 
34.  See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 
49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1345 n.87 (1997) (“[I]t is at least arguable that lying on the part of police in drug 
cases reflects the combination of the radical criminalization of drug offenses, racial bias, and a culture of 
policing which protects, rather than exposes, miscreants within the force.”); Alexander, supra note 27 
(“[T]he police have a special inclination toward confabulation, . . . [and] disturbingly, they have an incentive 
to lie.”). 
35.  See, e.g., Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and Garcetti, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 1329 (2012) (discussing how evisceration of civil rights remedies promotes police miscon-
duct). 
36.  See Natalie Lyons, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: California Penal Code Section 851.8 and the 
Injustice of Imposing a Factual Innocence Standard on Arrested Persons, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 485, 489 
(2013). 
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as Issa Kohler-Hausmann puts it, in some contexts “arrest without conviction 
is not only possible, but is the norm.”38 Legal guilt is an imperfect proxy for 
factual guilt,39 but it is the primary proxy that we have, as the next Subpart will 
discuss. 
B. Arrests ≠ Legal Guilt 
Legal guilt is defined in this Article as a procedurally valid conviction.40 
Our system for determining legal guilt, which sets up various processes and 
protections that must be honored in order to permit a valid declaration of 
legal guilt, is the primary proxy that we have for factual guilt.41 For all its im-
perfections,42 it is the best that we currently have. Only an all-seeing, all-
 
37.  See Brady, supra note 2, at 3 (“[I]n a number of large jurisdictions, the majority of criminal cases 
at the state level, both misdemeanors and felonies, are dismissed without prosecution.”); Gary Fields & 
John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
18, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-
lifetime-1408 415402 (stating that 47% of those arrested are not convicted). 
38.  Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 3, at 641. 
39.  See Bowers, supra note 28, at 1170–71 (“Courts have allowed defendants to plead guilty to day-
time burglaries to satisfy lesser charges, even when the crimes indisputably occurred in dark of night. 
Courts have upheld pleas to ‘hypothetical crimes’ that exist in no penal code and require impossible mens 
rea.” (footnote omitted)); Research Working Grp., Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice 
System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 671 (2012) (“Arrest and conviction rates do not correlate precisely with 
criminal behavior rates and cannot serve as a proxy for criminality.”); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. 
Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly Meets the MaHaRaL of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 613 (1991) (“Factual 
guilt has always seemed elusive. The best one can do in a criminal trial is to approximate truth, and only 
rather grossly at that.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 624–25 (“[I]n our imperfect world there is only one kind 
of ascertainable guilt, and that is legal guilt. The search for more is nothing less than arrogance.” (footnote 
omitted)); Carla Spivack, Killers Shouldn’t Inherit from Their Victims—Or Should They?, 48 GA. L. REV. 145, 204–
05 (2013) (“[P]lea bargaining is commonly acknowledged to be a flawed proxy for actual guilt.”). 
40.  See William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 844 (1988) (under the concept 
of “legal guilt,” a person “is deemed to be guilty only after the state establishes this fact by meeting all the 
procedural demands of the system”); William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331 
n.4 (1995) (“If convicted, whether factually guilty or not, one is legally guilty.”); Stefano Maffei & David 
Sonenshein, The Cloak of the Law and Fruits Falling from the Poisonous Tree: A European Perspective on the Exclu-
sionary Rule in the Gäfgen Case, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 21, 24 n.11 (2012) (“A person may be factually guilty, 
in that he actually committed the crime, but at the same time not be legally guilty, because the conviction 
was obtained in violation of the law.”); Mykola Sorochinsky, Prosecuting Torturers, Protecting “Child Molesters”: 
Toward a Power Balance Model of Criminal Process for International Human Rights Law, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 157, 
166 (2009) (“The pronouncement of legal guilt is only possible where there is not only a factual finding 
supporting the guilt, but where this finding is also made through proper procedures.”). 
41.  See David Blumberg, Note, Habeas Leaps from the Pan and into the Fire: Jacobs v. Scott and the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 61 ALB. L. REV. 557, 569 (1997) (“Legal guilt presumes factual 
guilt . . . .”). 
42.  See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. 
REV. 911, 912 (2011–2012) (“If one were asked to start from scratch and devise a system best suited to 
ascertaining the truth in criminal cases, and to ensuring that, to the extent any unavoidable errors in fact-
finding occur, they do not fall on the shoulders of innocent suspects, what would that system look like? It is 
inconceivable that one would create a system bearing much resemblance to the criminal justice process we 
now have in the United States.”); Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 
1616 (2017) (“The lack of procedures regulating plea negotiations means that the criminal system cannot 
effectively sort the innocent from the guilty during those negotiations. And the extremely high punishments 
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knowing entity could speak with absolute accuracy and authority on factual 
guilt,43 and as mentioned earlier,44 even she would be unable to provide a de-
finitive answer regarding certain charges that have an inescapably subjective 
component.45 As with factual guilt, there are several ways in which an arrest is 
distinct from legal guilt. 
First, a finding of legal guilt requires different—and more elaborate—
process than does an arrest. At trial, a declaration of legal guilt comes from a 
guilty verdict reached by judge or jury.46 Far more commonly, it is declared by 
a judge, as a result of a guilty plea.47 Arrests, by contrast, are typically effected 
by police officers and typically require advance approval by neither judges nor 
prosecutors.48 
These different processes bring with them different standards. An arrest 
is not supposed to occur unless law enforcement has probable cause to be-
 
imposed after conviction sometimes lead innocent defendants to plead guilty to avoid the risk of receiving 
those high sentences.”); Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding 
Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (“While the data varies somewhat from study to study, 
the consistent conclusion of the research is that innocent defendants are convicted with disturbing frequen-
cy.”); Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1964) (“It seems clear 
both as a matter of logical inference and of demonstrable fact that a defendant who is out on bail and who 
enjoys the services of a lawyer is less likely to plead guilty than is one who lacks one or both of these ad-
vantages.”); Donald H. Zeigler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2003 UTAH L. 
REV. 635, 689 n.297 (“Guilty pleas may be coerced by threatening lengthy incarceration or high bail if a 
defendant asserts her innocence, while offering a short sentence or even probation if the defendant pleads 
guilty.”). 
43.  See Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1585 n.16 
(1981) (“[F]actual guilt can never be fully known . . . .”). 
44.  See supra Subpart I.A. 
45.  See Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, but Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1, 58 (2010) (“Even if we know what happened, many cases turn on issues of human moti-
vation and responsibility, which may remain uncertain or which may properly be viewed from different 
perspectives.”); George C. Thomas III, “Truth Machines” and Confessions Law in the Year 2046, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 215, 227–28 (2007) (proposing the idea of subjecting suspects to a “truth machine,” and in light of 
complications that this would involve—“[W]hat if the issue is mens rea? Now the fact in the universe about 
guilt begins to grow fuzzy. What if the crime under investigation is a white collar crime rather than a com-
mon law crime? Is there a fact in the universe about, for example, conspiring to restrain trade?”—
suggesting that it might be “useful for investigating some crimes and not others”). 
46.  See Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 126, 129 
(2012) (“[T]rial . . . is the best mechanism for the determination of legal guilt . . . .”); Keith A. Findley, 
Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful Conviction, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 
334 (2002) (“The jury verdict is our almost sacred test for whether one is guilty or innocent.”). 
47.  See Findley, supra note 46, at 334–35. 
48.  See Jain, supra note 8, at 854 (“An arrest needs only a single police officer’s determination of 
probable cause.”); Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 1531 (“Police officers are not legally trained and thus may 
not understand that prosecutors will be unable to prove an element of the offense.” (footnote omitted)); id. 
at 1527 (“Even if we assume that most police officers are well intentioned—which I do—they are not 
infallible in deciding whom to arrest. Police receive very little legal training about their state’s criminal code. 
And officers rarely consult with prosecutors at the moment of arrest to ask whether it will be feasible to 
successfully prosecute the individual who is being arrested. Put simply, police are offered little guidance on 
arrests and must exercise their best judgment in determining whom to take into custody and whom to send 
on their way.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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lieve that the suspect committed a crime.49 This standard is a relatively low 
one.50 Those applying it, for example, may disregard exculpatory evidence.51 
Arrests differ still further from legal guilt in that many arrests fail to meet even 
the relatively low standard of probable cause.52 
By contrast, trial convictions are not supposed to occur unless the fact-
finders are convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond any reasonable doubt; at 
trial, the defense has the right not only to challenge the prosecution’s ability to 
prove one or more of the elements but also to mount affirmative defenses. As 
for the guilty plea, while it does not require proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt,53 it requires more than an arrest does. For example, a court is not sup-
posed to accept a guilty plea unless it is “supported by a factual basis and . . . 
the defendant’s waiver of her right to trial is voluntary and knowing.”54 A 
guilty plea also typically involves an admission of guilt.55 
This difference in process and standards corresponds to a difference in 
permissible consequences: punishment can follow a finding of legal guilt but 
cannot follow a mere arrest.56 After arrest, there are necessary precursors to a 
 
49.  See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
50.  See sources cited supra note 5. 
51.  See Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988) (“A policeman . . . is under no obliga-
tion to give any credence to a suspect’s story nor should a plausible explanation in any sense require the 
officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable 
cause.”); Fisher, supra note 32, at 30 (noting, during a discussion of his examination of police reports, that 
none of the training materials that he examined addresses “the importance of investigating, reporting, or 
recording exculpatory facts” and that instead they “reflect a psychological set in which the arrestee’s guilt is 
presumed, and the only use of notes and reports in the criminal process is to ensure conviction”); Givelber, 
supra note 34, at 1374 (“Police investigations and reports are incomplete and, generally, police do not con-
sider it their obligation to discover, investigate and record exculpatory matters.”). But see Bigford v. Taylor, 
834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (“As a corollary . . . of the rule that the police may rely on the totality 
of facts available to them in establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts tending to dissi-
pate probable cause.” (footnote omitted)). 
52.  See Harmon, supra note 25, at 341 (“[T]he vast majority of arrestees . . . are arrested for petty 
offenses en masse, often without probable cause.”); Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1331 (“A growing literature 
indicates that urban police routinely arrest people for reasons other than probable cause, that high-volume 
arrest policies such as zero tolerance and order maintenance create a substantial risk of evidentiarily weak 
arrests, that mechanisms for checking whether arrests are based on probable cause are sporadic, and finally 
that, if those mechanisms do kick in, police sometimes lie about whether there was sufficient evidence for 
an arrest.”). 
53.  See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 43. 
54.  Gold et al., supra note 42, at 1622 n.57 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11); see also Gregory M. Gilchrist, 
Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 165 (2011). Note that some states have 
not adopted the “factual basis” requirement. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 42 & n.72. 
55.  See Ortman, supra note 5, at 564 (“In a typical guilty plea, the defendant solemnly admits in open 
court that he is guilty of the crime charged, and a judge finds a ‘factual basis for the plea.’” (footnote omit-
ted)); id. at 564 n.302 (“Alford pleas, in which the defendant pleads guilty without confessing guilt, are an 
uncomfortable exception.”). 
56.  See Erica K. Beutler, A Look at the Use of Acquitted Conduct in Sentencing, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 809, 843 (1998) (“When the legislature statutorily classifies specific conduct as criminal, it 
can only punish that behavior by recourse to the criminal justice system established by the Constitution. A 
conviction is a necessary prerequisite to punishment based on that conduct. While not always an accurate 
barometer of factual guilt, conviction symbolizes legal guilt, thereby legitimizing the government’s authority 
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finding of legal guilt, and thus to the imposition of punishment: a prosecutor 
must first decide to file a charge; if a prosecution begins, defense is supposed 
to follow, ideally involving effective defense counsel, as well as things like de-
fense investigation, defense strategies, and the possible mounting of defens-
es.57 
II. THE FUSION OF ARREST AND GUILT 
If it seemed obvious that an arrest is distinct from guilt, whether legal or 
factual, then it may be surprising that the concepts of arrest and guilt often 
appear to be fused. The extent of this fusion demands explanation and merits 
concern. This Part lays out a variety of indications of such a fusion before 
Part III suggests some explanations and Part IV addresses one particularly 
urgent set of concerns. 
A. Consequences of Arrest 
An arrest brings what Adam Gershowitz calls “a huge litany of conse-
quences for the arrestee.”58 Many of them appear to rely on an assumption of 
criminal guilt, and this Subpart presents several of these, including conse-
quences imposed through law by the government, consequences imposed pri-
vately, and stigma imposed through both governmental and private acts. 
The legal consequences of arrest that appear to rely on an assumption of 
guilt (or an assumption that one’s likelihood of guilt is far higher than the low 
threshold that probable cause represents) are numerous. They include a per-
manent record that is accessible to the police and to others,59 violations of 
 
to deprive a person of his life, liberty or property.” (footnotes omitted)); Michael Edmund O’Neill et al., 
Past as Prologue: Reconciling Recidivism and Culpability, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 268 (2004) (“The American 
criminal justice system presumes innocence, not guilt. It is therefore abhorrent to base punishment merely 
upon the existence of an arrest, without more.”). 
57.  See Jain, supra note 8, at 820 (“Criminal procedure is intended to place important safeguards 
between a police officer’s decision to make an arrest and its subsequent consequences. Defendants in crim-
inal cases have the right to constitutionally adequate counsel, the right to suppress evidence that was illegal-
ly obtained, and the right to cross-examine witnesses, including testifying police officers.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
58.  Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 1530 (mentioning “incarceration, the need to post bail, internet-
accessible arrest records, mug shots, immigration and housing consequences because agencies track arrest 
records, the prospect of job loss because of incarceration, and difficulty in finding new work because of 
arrest records”). Harmon points out that an arrest can also “affect child custody rights, it can trigger depor-
tation, and it can get a suspect kicked out of public housing.” Harmon, supra note 25, at 314. Jain notes that 
an arrest can subject students at schools and universities to discipline. Jain, supra note 8, at 812. 
59.  See Jain, supra note 8, at 823 (“Absent robust sealing laws, police departments and others may 
widely disseminate criminal records, including arrests that did not result in conviction.”); id. at 824 (“Every 
state now either requires or permits criminal histories to be released to noncriminal justice agencies, such as 
those that grant licenses and provide social services. Commercial vendors also collect, store, and search 
arrest information. A number of states make arrest information publicly accessible, and some allow anyone 
who pays a fee to access an arrested individual’s criminal history. And the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
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probation and parole,60 occupational license suspension,61 civil asset forfei-
ture,62 bars on public benefits,63 and threats to child custody.64 An arrest on 
one’s record can make one ineligible for jury service.65 It can also make one 
ineligible for legal relief,66 as exemplified by a New York case in which a judge 
dismissed misdemeanor charges in the interests of justice for those defendants 
who had no arrest record, but declined to dismiss for those who had such a 
record.67 Referring to the arrest records as “record[s] of prior unlawful activi-
ty,”68 the judge explained his dichotomous decision: dismissal was appropriate 
where the defendants had previously led “a law abiding life,”69 but in cases 
“where a defendant previously has had or exercised that opportunity, but has 
thereafter again disregarded the law, a different matter is presented. Defend-
ants whose criminal records or records of prior unlawful activity thereby pre-
sent a history of disregard of the law, will not be permitted to benefit” from 
dismissal.70 
Privately imposed deprivation that appears to stem from an assumption 
of guilt following arrest includes adverse employment consequences.71 These 
consequences can include refusals to hire,72 disciplinary actions,73 suspen-
 
(FBI’s) fingerprint database—which was designed to provide law enforcement officials with the criminal 
histories of arrested individuals—has long been used outside the criminal justice system, such as by em-
ployers who conduct background checks.” (footnotes omitted)). 
60.  Id. at 825. 
61.  See id. at 840 (“As a matter of due process, a licensee may be entitled to a hearing before a license 
is revoked, but not necessarily before an unpaid license suspension. Until 2006, New York City taxi drivers, 
for instance, had their licenses automatically suspended for a wide range of arrests, including misdemeanor 
welfare fraud or forgery.” (citing Nnebe v. Dause, 644 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e think that in any 
given case, an arrest for a felony or serious misdemeanor creates a strong government interest in ensuring 
that the public is protected in the short term, prior to any hearing [for an arrested taxi driver].”))). 
62.  See id. at 819 (“Arrests can . . . give police officers the opportunity to respond to incentives that 
have little to do with crime control—such as seizing property through civil forfeiture laws or responding to 
arrest quotas.”). 
63.  See id. at 825. 
64.  Harmon, supra note 25, at 314. 
65.  See Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1319, 1330–31 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (not plain error to excuse 
a prospective juror on the basis of an arrest, where state’s exclusion statute requires that one be “generally 
reputed to be honest and . . . esteemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound judg-
ment”). 
66.  See, for example, New York’s Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal (ACD), which per-
mits delayed dismissal (and sealing) as long as one is not arrested in the interim. See Kohler-Hausmann, 
supra note 3, at 648. 
67.  See People v. Ben Levi, 565 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (Crim. Ct. 1990); Anna Roberts, Dismissals as 
Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 357 (2017) (discussing the case). 
68.  Ben Levi, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 406. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  See Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good Character Evidence to Undercut the Presumption 
of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 260 n.140 (2004) (“The fact that people are refused employment simply 
for being arrested attests to the presumption of guilt.”); Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 37. 
72.  Ross, supra note 71, at 260 n.140. 
73.  See Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2265, 2287 (2018). 
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sions,74 reassignments,75 and terminations.76 
Finally, arrests can lead to stigmatizing acts by both governmental and 
private entities.77 These acts include publication of arrests in print and elec-
tronic media,78 including the distribution of “mug-shots”79 and the phenome-
non of the “perp walk”80: the parading of an arrestee by law enforcement, 
frequently in coordination with members of the media.81 “Perp” is, of course, 
short for “perpetrator,” and both the act and the terminology used to describe 
it suggest an assumption that an arrest equals guilt.82 As JaneAnne Murray 
puts it, “[t]his walk is an embodiment of the presumption of guilt, and the 
criminal justice system’s faith in the screening role police officers play in sepa-
rating the culpable from the innocent.”83 
In light of these consequences, one may wonder about the extent to 
which the doctrinal prohibition on pre-conviction punishment84 is honored. 
Indeed, the law sometimes seems to acknowledge that the criminal process 
can inflict punishment in advance of adjudication. Thus, for example, when 
New York established its groundbreaking standards for judges to apply when 
 
74.  See Jain, supra note 8, at 815 (“Employers may suspend or fire an arrested worker, even when 
prosecutors or judges determine that a rogue police officer made a false arrest.”). 
75.  See id. at 812. 
76.  See id. at 840 (“Some employers suspend or terminate at-will employees based on the arrest.”). 
77.  See Shayna Jacobs et al., Hate-fueled Baltimore Man Saw First Victim as ‘Practice’ To ‘Kill Additional 
Black Men’ in Times Square, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york 
/white-supremacist-killer-planned-carnage-times-square-article-1.3006719?cid=bitly (“Jackson was led into 
court wearing a white Tyvek suit for a second straight day, with his hands cuffed and his feet shackled.”). 
78.  See François Quintard-Morénas, The Presumption of Innocence in the French and Anglo-American Legal 
Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 147 (2010) (referring to a New York Post front page showing “an ac-
cused in shackles with the headline ‘Monster in Chains,’” and noting that “the distinction between accused 
persons and convicted offenders has become staggeringly blurred in the United States”). 
79.  See Tim Stelloh, Opinion, Innocent Until Your Mugshot Is on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/opinion/sunday/innocent-until-your-mug-shot-is-on-the-internet. 
html. 
80.  See JaneAnne Murray, A Perfect Prosecution: The People of the State of New York Versus Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 371, 373 (2013) (“Strauss-Kahn experienced the presumption of guilt in 
the early stages following his arrest, most memorably in a humiliating ‘perp walk,’ the prosecutors’ opposi-
tion to bail, and the swift decision to indict.”); id. at 378 (“There are . . . few countries that subject high-
profile arrestees to the humiliation of the ‘perp walk.’ Rightly condemned worldwide as abhorrent to the 
ethos of the presumption of innocence, the images of Strauss-Kahn paraded in handcuffs carried enormous 
potential to sear him in the public’s imagination as guilty. These events are not accidents; they are orches-
trated as a reward to the investigating officers.” (footnote omitted)). 
81.  See Ryan Hagglund, Constitutional Protections Against the Harms to Suspects in Custody Stemming from 
Perp Walks, 81 MISS. L.J. 1757, 1767 (2012) (“Perp walks are a natural outgrowth of the symbiotic relation-
ship between law enforcement and the media. Accordingly, the police often assist the media’s efforts to 
obtain images of a suspect in custody.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1769 (“In the most egregious instances, 
the police will stage a perp walk, moving a suspect for a short distance and returning him to the place where 
he is being held, for no reason other than the creation of an opportunity for the press to observe the sus-
pect being moved while in custody.”). 
82.  See Scott Sayare et al., French Shocked by IMF Chief’s “Perp Walk,” N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2011), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/16/french-shocked-by-i-m-f-chiefs-perp-walk/. 
83.  Murray, supra note 80, at 378. 
84.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). 
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deciding whether to dismiss prosecutions in the interests of justice, one of the 
factors for them to consider was the “punishment already suffered by the de-
fendant.”85 Even when the statutory language changed,86 the factor main-
tained its relevance in the case law of that state and others,87 with courts freely 
using the term “punishment” to refer to preadjudication harms, including 
harms from and related to arrest, such as postarrest confinement.88 Thus, 
these consequences of arrest, and the ways in which the case law portrays 
them, hint at a regime in which the arrest represents the adjudicative mo-
ment,89 and punishment follows therefrom.90 
B. “Recidivism” 
The legal definition of “recidivism” is relatively straightforward. It means 
a return to criminal conduct.91 How to measure recidivism is a much bigger 
issue,92 particularly given the importance of the concept.93 Experts view recid-
ivism as crucial to both the study of individuals94 and the study of policy 
 
85.  People v. Clayton, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106, 110 (App. Div. 1993); see also People v. James, 415 
N.Y.S.2d 342, 346 (Crim. Ct. 1979) (“Each of these defendants has been arrested and spent at least some 
time incarcerated awaiting arraignment. The Court considers this enough punishment to satisfy this element 
of Clayton.”); Roberts, supra note 67, at 372 & n.330 (discussing these cases). 
86.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.40, 210.40 (McKinney 2007). 
87.  See, e.g., People v. Gragert, 765 N.Y.S.2d 471, 476 (Crim. Ct. 2003) (“[D]ue to the erroneous 
warrant, the defendant has already suffered a ‘punishment’ far greater than what would have resulted from 
her conviction in this case.”). 
88.  See, e.g., State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 239 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (dismissing case alleg-
ing bubble gum theft where “[t]he consequences which have already attended the arrest of this defendant 
are more punitive than those which would follow conviction”); People v. Doe, N.Y. L.J., April 6, 1979, at 
12 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978) (“The defendant has been subjected to punishment by virtue of his incarveration 
[sic] from the time of his arrest at approximately 5:40 A.M. on Sept. 22, 1978, until his release from custody 
upon parole at approximately 8:30 P.M. later that day, a period of about 14 hours.”); id. (stating that post-
arrest life “effectively amounted to . . . emotional and psychological incarceration”). 
89.  Jocelyn Simonson has explored the idea that the setting of bail often marks the true adjudicative 
moment. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 585 (2017) (“[F]or indigent de-
fendants, [bail] often serves the function that a real trial might, producing guilty pleas and longer sentences 
when an individual cannot afford to pay their bail.”). 
90.  See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979). 
91.  Joan Petersilia, Recidivism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 382, 382 (Marilyn D. 
McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996) (defining “recidivism” as “an offender’s return to crime”). 
92.  See John Nally et al., Post-Release Recidivism and Employment Among Different Types of Released Offenders, 
9 INT’L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI. 16, 20 (2014) (“[F]ive major indicators have been identified as measures of recid-
ivism, including (1) police arrest, (2) a criminal charge for a new offense, (3) a reconviction for a new crimi-
nal offense, (4) re-incarceration, and (5) a court-mandated supervision revocation (e.g., a probation or pa-
role violation) . . . .”). 
93.  See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 101 (2015) (“Reducing the recidivism rate now dominates all discussions of justice reinvestment 
and of penal policy more broadly.”). 
94.  See, e.g., Nally et al., supra note 92, at 19 (“Post-release recidivism is regarded as the primary 
measure of the success of an offender’s reentry into the community.”). 
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choices;95 indeed, it has been called “an existential test of the criminal justice 
system generally.”96 Its importance stems in part from the variety of prescrip-
tions that may be inspired by recidivism data. These include prescriptions 
about whether, how, and how long society should punish;97 what if any reha-
bilitative or reentry programs should be funded or offered;98 how probation 
and supervised release should function;99 how bail and pretrial detention 
should be used;100 whether “diversionary and treatment programs” are work-
ing;101 how policing should happen;102 and so on. 
Certain knowledge of recidivism can be as elusive as certain knowledge of 
factual guilt103—indeed, more so, because one would need to know about at 
least two instances of criminal conduct per person ((1) the initial criminal con-
duct, and (2) the return to criminal conduct). Therefore, those wishing to 
 
95.  Petersilia, supra note 91, at 382 (“Reducing recidivism . . . is one of the most important goals of 
the criminal justice system.”); Laura Ravinsky, Reducing Recidivism of Violent Offenders Through Victim-Offender 
Mediation: A Fresh Start, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1019, 1026 (2016) (“Recidivism analyses serve a 
critical societal role by allowing researchers to determine whether resources are being used efficiently and 
appropriately.”). 
96.  Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures of Recidivism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 788 (2014). 
97.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE PAST PREDICTS THE FUTURE: CRIMINAL HISTORY AND 
RECIDIVISM OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS 2 (2017) (“Recidivism information is central to three of the primary 
purposes of punishment as described in the [Sentencing Reform Act]—specific deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation—all of which focus on prevention of future crimes through correctional intervention.”); 
id. (“Considerations of recidivism by federal offenders were also central to the [Sentencing] Commission’s 
initial work in developing the Guidelines Manual’s criminal history provisions . . . and continue to be a key 
consideration in the Commission’s work today. Recent developments, particularly public attention to the 
size of the federal prison population and the cost of incarceration, have refocused the Commission’s inter-
est on the recidivism of federal offenders.” (footnote omitted)); id. (“Recidivism measures can provide 
policy makers with information regarding the relative threat to public safety posed by various types of 
offenders, and the effectiveness of public safety initiatives in (1) deterring crime and (2) rehabilitating or 
incapacitating offenders.”). 
98.  See Charles H. Rose III, Should the Tail Wag the Dog?: The Potential Effects of Recidivism Data on Char-
acter Evidence Rules, 36 N.M. L. REV. 341, 342 (2006) (“Governments use recidivism research to develop 
programs to handle rehabilitation, incarceration, and sentencing.”); Cecelia Klingele, Measuring Change: From 
Rates of Recidivism to Markers of Desistance, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript 
at 14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142405 (mentioning decisions about which 
treatment programs to fund). 
99.  See Nora V. Demleitner, How to Change the Philosophy and Practice of Probation and Supervised Release: 
Data Analytics, Cost Control, Focus on Reentry, and a Clear Mission, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 231, 232 (2016) (de-
scribing “reduction of recidivism” as “the apparent goal of the efforts to improve supervisory mecha-
nisms”). 
100.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW 7 (2016) (“Recidivism measures are used by numerous public safety agencies 
to measure performance and inform policy decisions and practices on issues such as pretrial detention, 
prisoner classification and programming, and offender supervision in the community.”). 
101.  Nora V. Demleitner, Judicial Challenges to the Collateral Impact of Criminal Convictions: Is True Change 
in the Offing?, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 150, 164 (2016) (“Recidivism has become the hallmark of release 
decisions and of judging the success of diversionary and treatment programs.”). 
102.  See Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 772 (1998). 
103.  See John Pfaff, @JohnFPfaff, TWITTER (June 21, 2017, 10:58 AM) (“None of our recidivism 
stats actually measure it, whatever ‘recid’ is. They measure CJ contacts (arrests, etc.), not actually offend-
ing.”). 
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measure recidivism rely on proxies. Conviction and incarceration are com-
monly used as proxies for criminal conduct in the recidivism context.104 So 
too, at least in this country, is arrest.105 
While this Article focuses on the complexities of using arrest, it is worth 
noting that each proxy has flaws.106 Conviction, for example, might seem like 
the best candidate, given that it denotes legal guilt. However, the usefulness of 
conviction rates to signify rates of “reoffending” is complicated by the influ-
ence of disparities in law enforcement.107 Convictions may also be an over-
inclusive measure of factual guilt,108 thanks to, for example, the coercive pres-
sure to take a guilty plea,109 rules that chill defendants’ trial testimony,110 bias 
among jurors (and others),111 the inadequacy (including inadequate re-
 
104.  See Rose, supra note 98, at 348–49. 
105.  See Demleitner, supra note 99, at 236 (“Many U.S. recidivism data sets are based on re-arrest 
rather than reconviction[,] . . . [but] European recidivism rates, for example, measure only convictions for a 
new offense, though in some countries violations of conditions of supervision amount to a new offense.”). 
106.  See Klingele, supra note 98 (manuscript at 15–16) (“[W]hile the criminal justice system purports 
to measure recidivism, what recidivism data usually measure are rates of re-capture—outcomes that turn as 
much on luck and policing patterns as they do on deviant behavior.”); id. (manuscript at 14) (stating that 
longitudinal studies are the “most effective” way of measuring behavior, and adding that “[i]n such settings, 
researchers follow subjects over long periods of time—often decades—periodically surveying, interviewing, 
and gathering third party data about subjects’ behavior”). 
107.  See Daniel P. Mears et al., Recidivism and Time Served in Prison, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
83, 100 (2016) (“A focus on felony conviction ensures that more serious offending is examined and reduc-
es, but does not eliminate, some of the problems associated with using arrest, such as the greater likelihood 
that recidivism in such instances includes situations where no offense occurred or measures both reoffend-
ing and differential police responses.”). 
108.  See id. This means that “recidivism” data that relies on convictions could be doubly overinclu-
sive, since it uses both a first conviction and a second conviction as proxies for factual guilt. 
109.  See Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and 
Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 652–53 (2011) (“[E]ven innocent defendants can be persuad-
ed by the staggering incentives to confess one’s guilt in return for a bargain. . . . [O]vercriminalization, the 
phenomenon that initially created swelling dockets and the need for plea bargaining, makes creating the 
incentives to plead guilty easy by propagating a myriad of broad statutes from which staggering sentencing 
differentials can be created.”); Jain, supra note 8, at 822 (“A 2013 study of low-income defendants facing 
misdemeanor charges relating to petty marijuana possession in the Bronx, New York, depicts a setting in 
which defendants routinely take plea agreements because it is too costly to contest charges at trial.”). 
110.  See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977 (2016). 
111.  See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012) (analyzing the 
numerous stages within criminal case trajectories at which biases can have an effect, including the police 
encounter, the charge and the plea bargain, the trial, and sentencing); Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by 
Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190 (2010) 
(demonstrating that mock jurors “held strong associations between Black and Guilty, relative to White and 
Guilty, and [that] implicit associations predicted the way mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence”); 
Jonathan A. Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders Can Affect Systemic Racist Assumptions, 16 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 999, 1007 (2013) (“[E]ven where people of color exercise their right to go to trial, 
there is a greater chance that the fact-finder—whether a jury or a judge—will interpret the facts in a manner 
consistent with guilt because of the defendant’s skin color. Therefore, defendants of color are more likely 
to plead guilty and to be found guilty at trial due to forces independent of their own culpability or the mer-
its of the case.” (footnote omitted)); Ronald J. Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases, Notwithstand-
ing President Obama’s Election, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 256–57 (2010). 
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sources112 and excessive caseloads113) of much defense representation,114 and 
restrictions on investigation115 and discovery.116 The risk of overinclusiveness 
applies to trial convictions;117 it may apply still more forcefully to guilty 
pleas.118 Convictions are also often said to be an underinclusive measure of 
factual guilt,119 as in this discussion by Joan Petersilia of important precautions 
to be taken by “those undertaking recidivism research, reviewing it, or com-
paring or reporting it”120: 
 
112.  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570 n.242 
(2001) (“Legislatures . . . fund appointed defense counsel at levels that require an enormous amount of 
selectivity—counsel can contest only a very small fraction of the cases on their dockets, and can investigate 
only a small fraction of the claims their clients might have.”). 
113.  See, e.g., NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIME, MASSIVE WASTE: THE 
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 9 (2009) (“In Chicago, Atlanta and 
Miami, defenders carry more than 2,000 misdemeanor cases per year. With these massive caseloads, de-
fenders have to resolve approximately 10 cases a day—or one case every hour—not nearly enough time to 
mount a constitutionally adequate defense.” (footnote omitted)). 
114.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Seemingly 
impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel.”); Mary Sue Backus & Paul 
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1036 (2006) (“We 
now have evidence that overworked and incompetent lawyers contribute to wrongful convictions and that 
truly well-prepared defense lawyers, with adequate support services, can attack the other causes of wrongful 
convictions, such as mistakes in eyewitness identifications and insufficient investigations.”); William S. 
Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995) (“In 1984, Strickland v. Washington effectively discarded Gideon’s noble 
trumpet call to justice in favor of a weak tin horn. Directly contrary to its rhetoric in Strickland, the Court 
has effectively ensured that Gideon guarantees little more than the presence of a person with a law license 
alongside the accused during trial.” (footnotes omitted)). 
115.  See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 260, 277 (1995) (“[A] defendant who lacks the resources to investigate or to hire experts and conse-
quently doubts his ability to establish an affirmative defense or rebut the prosecution’s evidence may prefer 
whatever benefit is offered in a plea bargain over the risks of trial.”). 
116.  See, e.g., Murray, supra note 80, at 384 (“[S]uppression or late disclosure of Brady material is a 
recurrent problem nationwide and in New York State courts.”); B. Michael Dann, Free the Jury, 23 LITIG., 
Fall 2016, at 5, 6. 
117.  Cf. Givelber, supra note 34, at 1386, 1396. 
118.  See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the 
Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 496 n.70 (2008) (“There are many reasons to ques-
tion whether many defendants are in fact guilty of the underlying offense. For example, due to jail over-
crowding and large criminal dockets in major metropolitan areas, many defendants plead guilty in order to 
obtain their immediate release or to get to a less restrictive custodial environment rather than spending a 
substantial amount of time in a local jail awaiting a trial date.”); Mayson, supra note 3, at 556 (“[S]ome num-
ber of defendants plead guilty only because they are detained.”); Zeigler, supra note 42, at 689 (“Defendants 
plead guilty for many reasons not related to guilt, and the charge pled to may not be the crime actually 
committed.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 689 n.297 (“Guilty pleas may be coerced by threatening lengthy 
incarceration or high bail if a defendant asserts her innocence, while offering a short sentence or even 
probation if the defendant pleads guilty.”). 
119.  See Mia Bird & Ryken Grattet, Realignment and Recidivism, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 176, 183 (2016) (“Reconviction is a conservative measure of recidivism because it omits criminal activi-
ties for which there is insufficient evidence or any number of reasons for abandoning a prosecution.”). 
120.  Petersilia, supra note 91, at 384–85 (offering a kind of “checklist” for those “undertaking recidi-
vism research, reviewing it, or comparing or reporting it,” which involves “specifying exactly the dimen-
sions that will be used in calculating the recidivism rates,” including the “type of recidivism event”).  
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It is critical that the particular type of recidivism event be specified, alt-
hough there is no agreement on which type of event is the best measure of 
recidivism. Some have argued that recidivism is best measured closest to 
the event (at arrest), since later events take us further away from the of-
fense itself and so many arrests fail to result in conviction—leading to an 
underestimation of recidivism. But others argue that convictions are a 
more appropriate measure, since many arrests are unfounded and the defi-
nition of arrest differs so widely from one jurisdiction to another.121 
In work that uses rearrest as a proxy for recidivism, one does sometimes 
find the kind of careful and explanatory approach that Petersilia recommends. 
Some authors acknowledge the imperfections of arrests as a measure of recid-
ivism, compare those imperfections to the flaws that are inherent in other 
measures,122 and then explain their decision to use arrest rates (perhaps in 
conjunction with other measures), with caveats attached.123 
But in other instances, one finds references to recidivism that suggest the 
same kind of unquestioned fusion of arrest and guilt that is described else-
where in this Article. Sometimes this fusion appears in explicit (but unsup-
ported) assumptions. In a report on “Federal Child Pornography Offenses,”124 
for example, the Sentencing Commission defined “known recidivism” to in-
clude arrests, even where the disposition of the case is unknown.125 The 
Commission stated that its study, “like other studies, assumes that false arrests 
are exceptional and that the typical arrest of an offender on supervision re-
flects recidivism (including ‘technical’ violations of the conditions of supervi-
sion).”126 
 
121.  Id. at 384. 
122.  See Laura M. Baber & Mark Motivans, Extending Our Knowledge About Recidivism of Persons on 
Federal Supervision, 77 FED. PROBATION 23, 23 (2013) (justifying decision to use rearrest as a primary out-
come measure in part because “unlike convictions, arrests are more available in automated criminal history 
records”). 
123.  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 100, at 7 (“Recidivism is typically measured by 
criminal acts that resulted in the rearrest, reconviction, and/or reincarceration of the offender over a speci-
fied period of time. These are the three recidivism measures used in this report. . . . [M]any rearrests do not 
ultimately result in a reconviction or reincarceration for reasons relating to procedural safeguards (e.g., the 
suppression of evidence for an unconstitutional search or seizure), lack of sufficient evidence to convict or 
revoke, and prosecutorial or judicial resource limitation. . . . Even using the least restrictive measure, rear-
rest, does not count the full extent of offender recidivism, as many crimes go unreported to police or, if 
reported, do not result in an arrest.” (footnote omitted)). 
124.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES (2012). 
125.  Id. at 296 n.17. 
126.  Id. “‘Technical’ violations of supervision encompass a wide range of behavior, including ab-
sconding from supervision, refusing to participate in mental health or substance abuse treatment, and fail-
ing drug tests. In addition, sex offenders typically are subject to additional restrictions, such as prohibitions 
on associating with minors or frequenting places where minors regularly appear, and accessing the Internet 
without permission.” Id. at 297. Note that recidivism figures on arrest often include not only arrests for 
alleged crimes, but also “arrests for alleged violations of supervised release, probation, or state parole.” U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 100, at 7. A parole violation is “generally something that is not a crime 
for anyone who is not on parole—things like going to a bar or visiting a friend who’s also an ex-felon.” Ira 
Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime 
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More often, an assumption that an arrest equals guilt goes unstated in 
sources that refer to rearrest as recidivism without caveat, despite the differ-
ences between arrest and both factual and legal guilt. This can occur in prima-
ry research or in secondary sources that fail to mention the fact that the recid-
ivism data being discussed is based in whole or in part on arrest.127 When 
viewed in combination with the other data that this Article describes, this ap-
parent lapse in careful sourcing and critical analysis may be explained by an 
underlying pull to fuse arrest with guilt, such that the need to identify and de-
scribe the underlying data is overlooked. 
Since recidivism consists of criminal behavior followed by further crimi-
nal behavior, arrests can be—and are—used as a proxy for either initial crimi-
nal behavior or subsequent criminal behavior, or in some instances both. Ar-
rests appear fused with initial criminal behavior in assertions that judges 
considering whether to set bail—on a legally innocent defendant—need to 
consider the risk of “further offenses,”128 or in assertions that those diverted 
from the criminal justice system (before guilt is determined) may “recidi-
vate,”129 or in language that lumps “arrestees” into the family of “offend-
ers”130: in the words of one article, “in terms of offenders’ likelihood to en-
gage in future criminal conduct, it makes little sense to separate those offenders 
who have only arrests from those who have convictions.”131 
Arrests appear fused with subsequent criminal behavior when those arrested 
after prison are described as “recidivists.”132 These sources equate arrests with 
“criminal acts,”133 “antisocial behavior,”134 “misbehavior,”135 or “miscon-
 
Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 501 (2015). Arrests based on alleged violations, as opposed to alleged 
crimes, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
127.  See Keith Soothill, Sex Offender Recidivism, 39 CRIME & JUST. 145, 159 (2010) (“Assessing sources 
is tedious but essential work in interpreting recidivism rates.”). 
128.  See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Pre-Trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence, in PREVENTION AND THE 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 120 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013). 
129.  See, e.g., Virginia Aldigé Hiday et al., Effectiveness of a Short-Term Mental Health Court: Criminal 
Recidivism One Year Postexit, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 401 (2013) (discussing “recidivism”—that is, arrest—
of participants in a mental health court, into which participants are diverted preadjudication); Jennifer L. 
Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 113 tbl.1 (2011) (including within a category labeled as “Contemporary pro-
gram[s] for offenders with mental illness” a “jail diversion” program, in which participants with mental illness 
are diverted from jail into treatment, either pre- or post-booking, and in tracking the “recidivism” rates of its partici-
pants, stating that there is “[n]o difference between groups in re-arrests over one year” (emphasis added)). 
130.  See, e.g., Patrick Kenneally, Legislation to Admit Evidence of Propensity When Prosecuting DUI Recidi-
vists, 37 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 126, 129 & n.7 (2016). 
131.  O’Neill et al., supra note 56, at 268 (emphasis added). 
132.  See, e.g., Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, 15 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 58 (2002). 
133.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 100, at 7 (“Recidivism is typically measured by crim-
inal acts that resulted in the rearrest, reconviction, and/or reincarceration of the offender over a specified 
period of time.”). 
134.  Compare Jason Matejkowski & Michael Ostermann, Serious Mental Illness, Criminal Risk, Parole 
Supervision, and Recidivism: Testing of Conditional Effects, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 79 (2015) (“By combining 
rearrests and revocations into a measure of ‘recidivism,’ we represent the first officially recognized antiso-
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duct,”136 despite the many factors that can lead to an arrest in the absence of 
crime commission.137 One article even talks about arrests being “commit-
ted.”138 In these sources, record-of-arrests-and-prosecution sheets (“RAP 
sheets”) are given credence as accurate indicators not only of arrests but of 
criminal conduct lying behind those arrests.139 Indeed, the words “arrest” and 
“crime commission” are sometimes used interchangeably, as in this article on 
“recidivism of prisoners”: “Some released prisoners crossed State lines and 
committed new crimes. For example, some of the prisoners released in Delaware in 1994 
were arrested for new crimes in Pennsylvania in 1995 . . . .”140 Arrests appear 
fused with both initial and subsequent criminal behavior in sources that detect 
“recidivism” in the scenario where participation in diversionary programs (ab-
sent a conviction) is followed by rearrest.141 
Thus, in numerous writings on recidivism, one sees arrests being used, 
without caveat or analysis, as equivalent to guilt. The concepts seem to be 
fused142 despite their distinctness and despite the particular need for precision 
 
cial behavior that is exhibited by the former prisoner . . . .”), with MARK H. MOORE ET AL., REPORT OF THE 
PROJECT ON PUBLIC DANGER, DANGEROUS OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, ch. III, at 
21 (1981) (“A criminal record (whether arrest or conviction) is produced by a social process in which the 
actual conduct of the individual is a trivial part.”). 
135.  Matejkowski & Ostermann, supra note 134, at 79 (“[T]he definition of recidivism used here 
[rearrest or parole revocation] reflects the first officially recognized misbehavior that is temporally closest to 
the individual’s release date.”). 
136.  See Rose, supra note 98, at 348 (“[Rearrest] is the first point where verifiable and reliable infor-
mation identifies and quantifies the substantive contact between convicted criminals and new misconduct 
that potentially resembles the misconduct that formed the basis for previous conviction(s).”). 
137.  We can assume, conversely, that some crimes are committed without arrests having been made, 
see Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive Detention and the Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juve-
niles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 427 (1996) (“Rearrest rates may be under-
inclusive because they do not reflect undetected crimes. However, at the same time, they may be overinclu-
sive because they equate an arrest with guilt.” (footnote omitted)), but there is no reason to believe that 
these two inaccuracies cancel each other out. 
138.  Jeffrey C. Sandler et al., Does a Watched Pot Boil?: A Time-Series Analysis of New York State’s Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 284, 284 (2008) (“[O]ver 95% of all 
sexual offense arrests were committed by first-time sex offenders, casting doubt on the ability of laws that 
target repeat offenders to meaningfully reduce sexual offending.”). 
139.  Cf. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES 294–95 (2012) 
(stating that RAP sheets can “only be used to determine the rate of known recidivism,” and thus opining that 
RAP sheets actually “underreport the actual recidivism rate of offenders”). 
140.  Langan & Levin, supra note 132, at 60 (emphasis added). For an analogous example of “arrest” 
and “offense” being used interchangeably, see Teresa L. Welch & Samuel P. Newton, The History and Prob-
lems of Utah’s Sex Offender Registry: Why a Move from a Conviction-Based to a Risk-Assessment Approach Better Protects 
Children, 47 CRIM. LAW BULL. 1105, 1144 (2011) (“National and Utah statewide statistics do not show a 
decline in sex offense arrests resulting from the implementation of sex offender registry and notification 
laws. If the registries were truly effective, we would see a substantial decline in sex offenses within the last 
ten years based upon the increase in registry requirements. Instead, arrests for sex offenses have basically 
maintained their numbers.” (footnote omitted)). 
141.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
142.  Cf. Roberts, supra note 110, at 2015 (suggesting that prior conviction impeachment continues 
despite all the critiques that it has received because it squares with underlying assumptions that criminal 
convictions are useful indicators of criminal propensity). 
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when addressing a topic of this importance. 
Some notice this.143 Some seem annoyed by it.144 But none seem to have 
posited an explanation or tied this phenomenon to the other manifestations of 
an assumption that an arrest equals guilt. This assumption, while always prob-
lematic, may be particularly problematic in the recidivism context, given the 
fact that once one has a criminal record one is particularly vulnerable to re-
arrest.145 
C. Risk-Assessment Tools 
Risk-assessment tools are used both to help decide whether to detain or 
set bail on a defendant preadjudication and to help decide what sentence to 
impose.146 In both settings, defendants are vulnerable to fusions of arrests 
with guilt. And in both settings, the tools are gaining significant popularity. 
Risk-assessment tools in the preadjudication context are found in about forty 
jurisdictions147 and in the sentencing context in more than twenty states.148 
As Jessica Eaglin points out, most risk-assessment tools used at sentenc-
 
143.  See, e.g., Benjamin Levin (@hashtagblevin), TWITTER (Aug. 22, 2017, 8:49 AM), https://twitter. 
com/hastagblevin/status/900022109136494593 (noting a flaw in the study of recidivism, namely that “re-
arrest =/= reoffending”). 
144.  See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, (@j_simonson), TWITTER (Mar. 22, 2017, 6:26 AM), https://twitter 
.com/j_simonson/status/844540912504111105 (“Also can law profs & social scientists stop equating an 
arrest with criminal conduct/‘reoffending’/dangerousness?”); John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Mar. 
22, 2017, 6:28 AM), https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/844541272442507265 (retweeting Simonson 
with appended message, “‘Recidivism’ is probably the most abused/misused/misunderstood word and 
statistical measure in all of criminal justice.”). 
145.  See MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 56–57 (1984) (“[S]uppose that a person convicted of 
child molesting has actually been rehabilitated. This does not make him immune from arrest; on the contra-
ry, that person may be subject (and subjected) to arrest frequently, whenever a child is molested anywhere 
nearby. An arrest of this type should not be an indicator of recidivism.”); Bowers, supra note 22, at 1126 
(“[P]olice are prone to arrest recidivists on less concrete evidence, because police often start with the recidi-
vists—for instance, by directing crime victims to mug-shot books composed exclusively of prior ar-
restees.”); Mark Kielsgard, Myth-Driven State Policy: An International Perspective of Recidivism and Incurability of 
Pedophile Offenders, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 247, 257 (2014) (“[S]ex offenders are frequently targeted if any 
crime is committed nearby. This is supported by the data . . . showing a nearly fifty-percent acquittal rate 
for new offenses.”); Soothill, supra note 127, at 160 (“I need to highlight a matter of increasing concern in 
discussing reoffending and recidivism. There is a tendency, particularly in the United States, to accept, for 
example, arrest figures as a valid measure of sexual offending. Rearrest is a hazard for known sex offenders 
and is likely to happen on much less evidence than for other members of the population. Without the 
scrutiny of the court, there is the danger of recidivism rates being inflated by police simply acting on the 
stereotype of the repeat sex offender.”). 
146.  Indeed, there are many other uses. See Klingele, supra note 98 (manuscript at 22) (mentioning 
their use in “correctional decisionmaking”); Jon Schuppe, Post Bail, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbc 
news.com/specials/bail-reform (Aug. 22, 2017) (“There are dozens of risk assessment tools in use today, 
developed by universities, governments, private companies and nonprofit agencies. They are used at various 
points of the criminal justice system, from pretrial to sentencing to parole.”). 
147.  See Mayson, supra note 3, at 510 (adding that the number “is growing fast”). 
148.  See Schuppe, supra note 146. 
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ing “rely on arrest as the measure of recidivism.”149 Similarly, in the preadjudi-
cation context, Sandra Mayson notes that what is described as an assessment 
of the risk of “new criminal activity” usually equates to an assessment of the 
risk of arrest.150 Treating arrest as synonymous with criminal activity is one 
example of a fusion of arrest and guilt, and Mayson lays out some of its weak-
nesses: 
[R]isk assessment tools should stop measuring crime risk in terms of the 
likelihood of arrest for anything. “Any arrest” is an overbroad proxy for 
harm. Some eleven million people are arrested each year; their charges 
range from unpaid traffic fines to murder. One-third of arrests lead to 
dismissal or acquittal. And members of poor communities of color are 
disproportionately arrested for low-level crimes.151 
Hannah Jane Sassaman echoes some of these concerns, emphasizing the 
key point that to predict risk in the form of arrest is actually to predict law 
enforcement activity: “Almost all risk-assessment tools use criminal justice 
data as proxies for crime. Most forecast future arrest, which is actually predict-
ing law enforcement behavior.”152 
The fusion of arrest and guilt appears with respect to past arrests, in addi-
tion to future (anticipated) arrests.153 In the sentencing context, past arrests 
are sometimes factored into the risk calculation.154 In the bail context, risk-
assessment tools may also consider past arrests as indicative of future risk.155 
In addition, in the bail context, the existence of a charge in the current case is 
 
149.  Eaglin, supra note 16, at 76 (noting, however, that “some variation exists within this principle 
across tools”). 
150.  See Mayson, supra note 3, at 509 (“Existing pretrial tools assess the risk of two outcomes: failure 
to appear (FTA) and rearrest.”). 
151.  Id. at 562 (footnotes omitted). Rather than repudiating altogether the use of arrest in this con-
text, Mayson reaches the conclusion that “arrest for a serious violent crime” is currently “the best measure 
available,” and thus proposes its use: “Pretrial risk assessment tools should instead measure crime risk in 
terms of the likelihood of rearrest for a serious violent crime in the pretrial phase. This measure does not 
avoid all difficulties. The harm is the actual commission of violent crime. Many people are wrongfully ar-
rested, and many people who commit violent crimes escape arrest. So, arrest for a serious violent crime is 
still both over- and under-inclusive as a proxy for the commission of violent crime itself.” Id. 
152.  Hannah Jane Sassaman, Debating Risk-Assessment Tools, MARSHALL PROJ. (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/25/debating-risk-assessment-tools (adding that “[w]e know 
that certain communities, especially communities of color, are disproportionately over-policed, more likely 
to be over-charged by prosecutors, and forced into pleas that result in convictions”). 
153.  See Eaglin, supra note 16, at 97 (“[R]isk tool developers often choose to estimate recidivism risk 
as chance of arrest based upon factors like prior arrest.”); id. at 98 (arrest data is, thus, used “as both a 
predictor and an outcome”). 
154.  See id. at 82–83 (describing a number of tools that use past arrests). 
155.  See Mayson, supra note 3, at 509 (“Having been arrested before age eighteen might be three 
points, for example . . . .”). Some, however, have rejected this as a predictor. See, e.g., Schuppe, supra note 
146 (“[T]he [Public Safety Assessment’s] developers excluded factors that were predictive but also likely 
served as proxies for race, such as a person’s arrest history and number of misdemeanor convictions.”). 
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frequently taken as indicative of guilt.156 As Mayson puts it, judges assess the 
risk of “new criminal activity,” thus assuming that there has already been 
“criminal activity”157 and thus provoking due process concerns.158 
D. Linguistic “Slips” 
In at least some instances, “recidivism” is consciously chosen to denote 
the rearrest of someone with a criminal record; other terms that are some-
times consciously deployed in a way that fuses arrest and guilt include “crimi-
nogenic” (when referring to factors that appear to lead to arrest)159 and “sex 
offender” (when describing someone arrested for a “sex offense”).160 But there 
are also an array of terms that fuse arrest and guilt in a way that appears unin-
tended. Thus, for example, one frequently finds the terms “offender,”161 “of-
fense,”162 “reoffending,”163 and “crime,”164 where the legally correct terminol-
 
156.  Here, the fusion seems to be between charge and guilt rather than arrest and guilt. The relation-
ship between these two fusions will be addressed further below. See infra Subpart II.E. 
157.  See Mayson, supra note 3, at 537. 
158.  See id. (“[T]o invoke a defendant’s guilt as justification for pretrial restraint threatens fundamen-
tal due process values, which tend to run under the heading of the ‘presumption of innocence.’ Defendants, 
after all, have only been accused. Many are not guilty. Fewer than seventy percent of felony arrests nation-
wide lead to conviction. And the protection of accused people against false condemnation and punishment 
is a core commitment of the criminal justice system.” (footnote omitted)). 
159.  See generally, e.g., Avinash Singh Bhati & Alex R. Piquero, Estimating the Impact of Incarceration on 
Subsequent Offending Trajectories: Deterrent, Criminogenic, or Null Effect?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 207 
(2007) (using arrest histories of released prisoners to investigate whether prison has a “criminogenic” ef-
fect). 
160.  William Encinosa & Michael Roussis, An Empirical Analysis of California Assembly Bill 488: Access 
to Information on Registered Sex Offenders over the Internet Reduces Recidivism, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 429, 446 
(2011) (“We identify a sex offender in the California Department of Justice arrest data as any person who 
has been arrested for a registrable sexual offense.”). The fact that “sex offender”—one of the most in-
flammatory and stigmatizing terms within the criminal lexicon—is used in this way helps to illustrate the 
strength of this fusion. 
161.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330 (2012) (“Atwater did not address 
whether the Constitution imposes special restrictions on the searches of offenders suspected of committing 
minor offenses once they are taken to jail.”); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (8th ed. 2007) (“Because officers cannot possibly arrest all the of-
fenders they encounter, they must decide which scuffles warrant an arrest for assault.”); Michael F. Cald-
well, Quantifying the Decline in Juvenile Sexual Recidivism Rates, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 414, 414 (2016) 
(referring to juvenile sexual offense arrestees as “juvenile sexual offenders”); Brian D. Shannon, Prescribing a 
Balance: The Texas Legislative Responses to Sell v. United States, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 309, 339 n.117 (2009) 
(“Bexar County and the Center for Health Care Services have been leaders in efforts to create meaningful 
diversion programs for offenders with mental illness caught up in the criminal justice system.”). 
162.  Henry Gass, Meet a New Breed of Prosecutor, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 17, 2017), https:// 
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/0717/Meet-a-new-breed-of-prosecutor (“From Texas to Florida 
to Illinois, many of these young prosecutors are eschewing the death penalty, talking rehabilitation as much 
as punishment, and often refusing to charge people for minor offenses.”). 
163.  See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop et al., Juvenile Justice Under Attack: An Analysis of the Causes and Impact of 
Recent Reforms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 146 (1998) (“[W]e examined differences in the severity of 
rearrest offenses across the two groups. Ninety-three percent of the transferred youths who reoffended 
were arrested on felony charges.”); Enrique A. Monagas & Carlos E. Monagas, Prosecuting Threats in the Age of 
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ogy would be “alleged” offender/offense/reoffending/crime. Here, as often, 
language seems to serve as a “window to the unconscious”165 and, specifically, 
into an unconscious fusion of arrest and guilt. 
E. “Everyone Pleads Guilty”166 
A final example involves a statistical error. Legal scholars, as well as oth-
ers,167 commonly assert that 90 or 95% of criminal cases end in a guilty plea.168 
It is unclear whether those making this assertion are thinking that a “criminal 
case” begins with an arrest or with a prosecution.169 Either way, these state-
ments are inaccurate. They mistakenly characterize the percentage of convictions 
 
Social Media, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REV., Summer 2016, at 57, 75 (“[S]uspects likely to reoffend should be charged 
and prosecuted more aggressively, because those individuals pose the greatest risk to the community.”). 
164.  See, e.g., Dana Houle (@DanaHoule), TWITTER (Mar. 21, 2017, 6:51 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
DanaHoule/status/844184770049392642 (attaching image of headline describing crimes followed by first 
paragraph describing arrests, and stating that the “[m]ost broke thing in US journalism is headlines, example 
infinity: headline says crimes, lede says alleged. BIG DIFFERENCE”). 
165.  See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 7, 16 (1993) (“When 
we are made to realize that, to take a simple example, we use the verb ‘to father’ to refer to impregnation 
but use the verb ‘to mother’ to refer to nurturing, we learn a great deal about the unconscious assumptions 
we unwittingly continue to make with respect to parenting.”); Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neocon-
servative Case Against Hate-Speech Regulation—Lively, D’Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1807, 1814 (1994) (“Thought and language are inextricably connected. A speaker who is asked to 
reconsider his or her use of language may begin to reflect on the way he or she thinks about a subject. 
Words, external manifestations of thought, supply a window into the unconscious. Our choice of word, 
metaphor, or image gives signs of the attitudes we have about a person or subject.” (footnote omitted)). 
166.  David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 487 (2016) (quoting, and disagreeing with, Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: 
Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004)). 
167.  See Adam Gopnik, How We Misunderstand Mass Incarceration, NEW YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/10/how-we-misunderstand-mass-incarceration (“Some 
ninety-five per cent of criminal cases in the U.S. are decided by plea bargains . . . .”); Jessica Pishko, Prosecu-
tors Are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice Reform, NATION (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.thenation 
.com/article/prosecutors-are-banding-together-to-prevent-criminal-justice-reform/ (“Today, around 95 
percent of federal and state criminal cases end in a plea bargain.”); Jeffrey D. Stein, Opinion, How to Make 
an Innocent Client Plead Guilty, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/w 
hy-innocent-people-plead-guilty/2018/01/12/e05d262c-b805-11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_t 
erm=.d28072535321 (“It’s no wonder 95 percent of all defendants accept plea offers.”). 
168.  See Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 84 (“Today, over 95 percent of defendants in the criminal justice system plead 
guilty . . . .”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement 
Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 502 (1985) (“Over 90% of all cases (both civil and criminal) are currently 
settled and taken out of the system . . . .”); Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The 
Law and Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1653 n.38 (2000) (“Statistics 
indicate that over 90% of defendants charged with violent felonies plead guilty.”). As Sklanksy points out, 
some just go ahead and say that “[e]veryone pleads guilty.” Sklansky, supra note 166, at 487. 
169.  See John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:34 AM), https://twitter.com/JohnF 
Pfaff/status/920659342201892866 (pointing out that when people assert that “95 percent of federal and 
state criminal cases end in a plea bargain,” it is unclear whether they are using “case” to mean “prosecu-
tion” or “arrest”); Adam Gershowitz (@AdamGershowitz), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:36 AM), https:// 
twitter.com/AdamGershowitz/status/920659898622513152 (tweeting in response to Pfaff that “I think the 
average arrested defendant processed in a jail would think case means arrested”). 
ROBERTSFINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  8:00 PM 
2019] Arrests As Guilt 1011 
that are pleas as the percentage of cases that are pleas, and thus they erase 
something important. The erroneous statistics erase those cases that end in 
dismissal or acquittal.170 That is a significant erasure. For example, Gershowitz 
points out that prosecutors “dismiss a huge number of cases with no convic-
tion being entered.”171 
Figures representing the percentage of cases ending in guilty pleas vary 
according to jurisdiction, but however one defines “cases,” they are less than 
90%. So, for example, according to one recent study, a little under two-thirds 
of felony defendants arraigned in state courts in the seventy-five largest coun-
ties pled guilty.172 In D.C. Superior Court, 42% of all defendants pled guilty; 
53% had their cases dismissed post-filing.173 In federal court, where there is a 
smaller drop-off between prosecution and conviction, the figures diverge less 
dramatically from the erroneous version, but they still diverge. In 2015, 88% 
of federal defendants ended their cases with a plea of either guilty or nolo con-
tendere; the percentage of convictions that involved a guilty or nolo contendere 
plea was 97.5%.174 
Again, some have noticed this error.175 Some are annoyed by it.176 No one 
 
170.  David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil 
Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 696 n.37 (2006) (“[T]his [95% figure] 
disregards all dispositions that were unilaterally terminated or that were otherwise dismissed.”). 
171.  Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 1527 & n.6 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics figures indicating 
that “prosecutors dismiss twenty-five percent of felony charges” and citing sources in support of the prop-
osition that the rate “is much higher in some jurisdictions”). Cases may also be judicially dismissed. See 
Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 170, at 696 n.37. 
172.  In a 2009 study of large urban counties by the Department of Justice’s State Court Processing 
Statistics project, “[a]mong cases that were adjudicated within the 1-year study period, 66% resulted in a 
conviction,” and “[n]early all convictions were the result of a guilty plea rather than a trial.” BRIAN A. 
REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 22 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc 
09.pdf. 
173.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 65 
tbl.17 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/988896/download. 
174.  See U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, Table D-4, at 1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/D04Sep15.p 
df. 
175.  See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 170, at 696 n.37 (“It is remarkably difficult to get robust 
statistics on the rate of civil or criminal consensual settlement. The most common mistake is to subtract the 
percentage of trials from the percentage of filings and thereby arrive at a figure of over 95% of settlements 
or plea bargains. That is an error because it disregards the circumstance that many civil cases end with 
dispositive adjudication before trial. Those cases end because of a judicial decision that concludes the case, 
not because the parties decide to control the risks of adjudication with an agreement. An analogous calcula-
tion on the criminal side would put consensual agreements at approximately 95%, but, again, this disregards 
all dispositions that were unilaterally terminated or that were otherwise dismissed. Our own estimates, for 
which we claim no great statistical sophistication, put both the rate of plea bargain and the rate of civil 
settlement at about 60–70% of filed cases—very high but not overwhelming.” (citations omitted)); Adam 
Gershowitz (@AdamGershowitz), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://twitter.com/AdamGe 
rshowitz/status/920658466959699968 (stating, in response to Jessica Pishko article, that “95% of criminal 
*cases* do not end in a plea bargain. 95% of convictions do. There is a difference between those two 
things!!!”); Carissa Byrne Hessick (@CBHessick), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:56 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
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appears to have posited a suggestion as to its cause. The frequency of this 
mistake—by people who understand the need for accuracy, precision, and 
appropriate sourcing and who are committed to exposing and deconstructing 
harmful assumptions about the criminal legal system—suggests that the error 
is allowed to slip through because it aligns with an assumption that is perva-
sive, albeit implicit177: that a governmental act that requires only probable 
cause (whether an arrest or a prosecutorial charge) is in fact equivalent to 
guilt. If one is conditioned to think of a finding of legal guilt as following on 
from a finding of probable cause,178 then one may be less likely to double-
check figures that suggest the same. 
*** 
As to several of these phenomena, one might proffer explanations such as 
inattention, sloppiness, or shorthand. Perhaps it could be said, for example, 
that it’s a little sloppy to refer to “recidivism” data without acknowledging 
that the metric is rearrest, or to make the plea rate error, or to use “offender” 
to mean “arrestee.” But sloppiness is more likely to occur when there is no 
resistance to it. This Article suggests that these many slips, mistakes, and eli-
sions meet with little resistance because of the strength of an underlying as-
sumption (namely, that arrest equals guilt) that facilitates them all. But how to 
explain that assumption? The next Part turns to that question. 
III. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
To be sure, there may be some explanations for the fusion that are unique 
to a particular context mentioned above. For example, a partial explanation 
for widespread acceptance of “recidivism” rates that include arrests (and thus 
that lie on the expansive end of the spectrum) may be a widespread, if implic-
 
CBHessick/status/920664882026110976 (reproducing Gershowitz’s tweet and adding that “Adam makes 
an important point here. We should all be careful to use the 95% statistic carefully (and correctly)”). 
176.  See Jeffrey Bellin (@BellinJ), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2018, 5:13 AM), https://twitter.com/BellinJ/st 
atus/984041645267210241 (“‘[P]lea deals, which is how more than 90 percent of criminal cases end[.]’ Why 
can no one get this stat right? Don’t fancy news sites have fact checkers – or is this said wrong so often it 
checks out each time?”) (attaching a National Public Radio story that makes the quoted error); Ron Wright 
(@wrightrf), TWITTER (July 25, 2017, 11:17 AM), https://twitter.com/wrightrf/status/889912552876 
126209 (retweeting Jeffrey Bellin, @BellinJ, TWITTER (July 19, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://twitter.com/Bel 
linJ/status/887819941721669632 (“Keep reading ‘95% of crim cases are resolved by guilty pleas’ when 
authors mean to say 95% of _convictions_ are guilty pleas.[ ]Big difference.”)) (“Agreed. This is annoy-
ing.”). 
177.  For the notion that hoaxes thrive and skepticism sleeps when the hoaxes square with our as-
sumptions and biases, see R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 824–25 (2004). 
178.  Probable cause is the standard to which prosecutorial charges, like arrest charges, are held. See 
Brandon Buskey, If the Convictions Don’t Fit, You Must Acquit: Examining the Constitutional Limitations on the 
State’s Pursuit of Inconsistent Criminal Prosecutions, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 311, 320–21 (2012). 
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it, belief that certain people (or groups) have a propensity to commit criminal 
acts.179 There are also some potential explanations that have been thoroughly 
explored in the literature, including “tunnel vision” affecting law enforcement 
and others.180 This Part will focus on explanations that are more broadly ap-
plicable and less well explored. 
A. “A System of Pleas”181 
It may be unsurprising that an arrest, whose core evidentiary requirement 
is an assertion of probable cause by law enforcement, has come to seem 
equivalent to guilt, given that our predominant means for declaring guilt—the 
guilty plea—has as its core evidentiary requirement an assertion of probable 
cause by law enforcement.182 
While of course there is a key distinction between an arrest and (the ma-
jority of) guilty pleas, namely that for the latter a defendant is required to 
make some sort of admission of guilt,183 various scholars have pointed out 
that in light of the coercive pressure to enter a guilty plea,184 the “admission” 
should be seen as little more than a formality,185 and indeed a formality that 
 
179.  See Roberts, supra note 110, at 2015 (suggesting that part of what sustains the practice of im-
peaching criminal defendants with their prior convictions is a societal belief in propensity); Ekow N. 
Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal 
Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1032–33 (2004). 
180.  See, e.g., Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (defining “tunnel vision” as “that ‘compendium of common heuristics 
and logical fallacies,’ to which we are all susceptible, that lead actors in the criminal justice system to ‘focus 
on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will “build a case” for conviction, while ignoring or sup-
pressing evidence that points away from guilt’” (quoting Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the 
“Laboratory” of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. 
REV. 847, 848 (2002)); id. (“This process leads investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers alike 
to focus on a particular conclusion and then filter all evidence in a case through the lens provided by that 
conclusion.”). 
181.  See Murray, supra note 80, at 372 (“The presumption of innocence may be the foundational 
principle of the American criminal justice system, but the presumption of guilt is its operational force. The 
US Supreme Court acknowledged this reality in two notable criminal law decisions in 2012, Lafler v. 
Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, when it described the criminal process as ‘a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials.’”). 
182.  See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 43–44 (stating that a summary by law enforcement of evidence 
providing a “factual basis” for a plea is probably sufficient where it establishes probable cause). 
183.  See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (“[A] counseled plea of guilty 
is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the 
issue of factual guilt from the case.” (emphasis omitted)); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970) 
(stating that pleas are typically accompanied by admission of guilt). 
184.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 226 (2013) 
(“For all but the simplest crimes, prosecutors can pile up charges to the point where the incentive to plea 
bargain becomes overwhelming.”). 
185.  See Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness Without 
Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2016) (describing the required allocution as “bare-
bones”). 
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may make a mockery of a system that is often said to be interested in truth.186 
So perhaps it is not that strange, for example, to use “offender” to refer 
to someone (an arrestee) who might be guilty,187 given that in our system of 
pleas “offender” (used in the “proper” sense, i.e., to refer to someone who is 
legally guilty) itself only means that the person convicted might be (factually) 
guilty.188 This may be particularly true given the centrality of pleas within our 
legal system: ours is not just a “system of pleas” in the sense that defendants 
are permitted to (and in large numbers do) take pleas,189 but also a system 
that, given the current rate of charging and resourcing, relies on pleas in order 
to continue to operate.190 If this standard and mode of “proof” establishes 
guilt in the plea bargaining context, it does not seem surprising that it has the 
same effect earlier in the process. If our system of plea bargaining “short-
circuits” the process of determining guilt,191 then perhaps it is unsurprising if 
we in our assumptions do the same. 
 
186.  See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 705 (1981) 
(“It . . . may seem strange suddenly to seek the virtues of consent at one stage of a stigmatizing, misery-
producing, and involuntary proceeding. Indeed, in most nations of the world, although civil disputes are 
compromised as freely as here, American plea bargaining apparently is regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of 
our nation’s commercial mentality.”); Bowers, supra note 22, at 1153 (mentioning critics who find that the 
propensity of defendants facing weak charges to “plead guilty to cheap pleas” has the effect of “under-
min[ing] the system’s central truth-seeking function”); id. at 1171 (“[The criminal justice system] finds 
something sacrosanct and inviolable—even magical—in the bottom-line accuracy of the defendant’s admis-
sion that she behaved (in some fashion) illegally. Institutional actors (who should know better) hold on to 
this last vestige of an antiquated truth-seeking ideal.” (footnote omitted)); Arthur Rosett, The Negotiated 
Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 70, 75 (1967) (“In many courts, the guilty-plea pro-
cess looks more like the purchase of a rug in a Lebanese bazaar than like the confrontation between a man 
and his soul.”). 
187.  John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Mar. 22, 2017, 6:19 AM), https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaf 
f/status/844538941311201281 (characterizing an arrest as “[a] cop’s suspicion. Maybe a crime, maybe 
not”). 
188.  See Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor 
Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1413–14 (2003) (“The plea bargaining system effectively substitutes a 
concept of partial guilt for the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is marvelously 
designed to secure conviction of the innocent.”); Alschuler, supra note 186, at 703 (“Adjudication is de-
signed to answer the question of which side is correct on a case-by-case basis. Settlement is not designed to 
answer this question but to produce an acceptable middle ground.”); Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Convic-
tion, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833, 851 (2012) (noting the probabilistic nature of pleas, and stating that “plea bar-
gains, by and large, adjust sentencing to the level of proof regarding culpability”); Michael Tonry, From 
Policing to Parole: Reconfiguring American Criminal Justice, in REINVENTING AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 
(Michael Tonry & Daniel S. Nagin eds., 2017) (conducting a comparative review and concluding that 
“[n]owhere else is a guilty plea enough by itself for a conviction; a judge must determine the facts, decide 
whether the defendant is guilty and of what, and impose a sentence”). 
189.  Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”). 
190.  See Ortman, supra note 5, at 554. 
191.  See Alschuler, supra note 186, at 692 (“A prosecutor or defense attorney whose primary concern 
is to cut corners probably would find a regime of plea bargaining ideally suited to his goals.”); Packer, supra 
note 42, at 38 (“[A] decision that the defendant will remain in custody once he has been charged may itself 
induce him to plead guilty, thereby short-circuiting the part of the process concerned with guilt determina-
tion and moving directly to the question of ultimate disposition.”). 
ROBERTSFINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  8:00 PM 
2019] Arrests As Guilt 1015 
B. The Costs of Diversion 
The hardships caused by the criminal process, including convictions, are 
so grave that numerous innovators have created mechanisms that aim to 
avoid some of those hardships. A variety of such innovations, such as diver-
sionary programs, “alternative” courts, and “problem-solving” courts, have 
been developed,192 and a significant component of many of them is that par-
ticipation can ward off the imposition of a criminal conviction and its mani-
fold consequences.193 
For all the relative advantages that participation in such programs may of-
fer, one trade-off for this escape from some aspects of the criminal process 
appears to be that certain hardships can be inflicted without what the criminal 
legal system would (at least in theory) first require—some sort of finding or 
acknowledgment of guilt. Thus, to be in such a program—even if one has not 
pled guilty as a condition of participation194—is often to be classed as an “of-
fender”195 and a possible “recidivism” risk,196 and to be seen as in need of 
“accountability,”197 rehabilitation,198 and penance.199 Thus, by leaping over any 
 
192.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Right to Plea Bargain with Competent Counsel After Cooper and Frye: Is 
the Supreme Court Making the Ordinary Criminal Process “Too Long, Too Expensive, and Unpredictable . . . in Pursuit of 
Perfect Justice”?, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 735, 745–46 (2013). 
193.  See Whitney C. Wootton, Diversion Not Deportation: Mitigating the Harsh Immigration Consequences of 
Minor Crimes, 16 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 217, 236 (2017) (“[Pretrial diversion programs] lead to lower recidi-
vism and allow individuals to avoid the long-term negative consequences of a criminal conviction, such as 
difficulty in finding housing and employment.”). 
194.  See id. at 242 (“[P]re-file diversion programs do not require participants to stipulate to the 
charges against them to qualify for diversion.”). 
195.  See generally, e.g., Hiday et al., supra note 129 (using the term “offenders” to describe participants 
in a mental health court, into which participants are diverted preadjudication). 
196.  See, e.g., Cory R. Lepage & Jeff D. May, The Anchorage, Alaska Municipal Pretrial Diversion Program: 
An Initial Assessment, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2017) (“Impact on future criminality (also known as recidi-
vism) is important. Approximately one-third of the participants were rearrested for any offense between 
two years and four and one-half years after they were admitted into the program, mirroring the recidivism 
rates in other states’ pretrial diversion programs.”). 
197.  See Jillian M. Cavanaugh, Helping Those Who Serve: Veterans Treatment Courts Foster Rehabilitation and 
Reduce Recidivism for Offending Combat Veterans, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 463, 471 (2011) (“Drug courts operate 
on the principles of treatment and accountability. Eligible offenders are taken before the drug court imme-
diately upon arrest or apprehension . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
198.  See Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 728 (1942) 
(“The presumption that to be charged means to be guilty has been tenaciously, if unconsciously, entertained 
by well-intentioned reformers lulled into complacency by humanitarian motives to substitute ‘treatment’ for 
punishment, and enlightened by negligible insight into the functions of criminal procedure.”). 
199.  See King County, Washington’s “Theft 3 and Mall Safety Pilot Project,” in which young people, 
suspected of shoplifting, but formally accused of nothing, write letters of “apology.” KING CTY., WASH., 
REG’L LAW SAFETY & JUSTICE COMM., JULY 27, 2017 MEETING SUMMARY (2017), http://www.kingcou 
nty.gov/~/media/depts/executive/performance-strategy-budget/documents/pdf/RLSJC/2017/July27/R 
LSJC-072717.ashx?la=en (“[A] young person gets picked up by a loss prevention specialist, calls [Tukwila 
Police Department], who walks them down to a community resource area staffed by [Glover Empower-
ment Mentoring (GEM)], GEM calls the parents and explains that the child has an opportunity to partici-
pate in a program. The youth is referred to a geographically and culturally specific group for case manage-
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requirements that guilt be established by means of evidence, these programs 
may help to support a notion that guilt is established at the time of arrest. 
The Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program in Seattle, 
for example, holds iconic and influential status,200 in part because it diverts so 
early—postarrest but pre-booking—in an effort to whisk one away as quickly 
as possible from certain harms that the criminal process imposes. And yet, 
this innovation may bring a cost: reinforcement of the fusion of arrest and 
guilt.201 LEAD’s website, for example, describes the program like this: 
“LEAD is a pre-booking diversion program that allows officers to redirect 
low-level offenders engaged in drugs or prostitution activity to community-
based services instead of jail and prosecution.”202 
C. Fusion of Act with Crime 
As mentioned above,203 proving the commission of an act is typically not 
enough to prove the commission of a crime. Our criminal codes have been set 
up to include additional elements, such as mens rea elements,204 and to provide 
for numerous defenses.205 Yet in the assumptions of the police and the pub-
 
ment. The youth writes an apology letter to the business, the theft charge doesn’t get filed, and the youth 
participates in voluntary programming and services.”). 
200.  For an explanation of the Obama White House’s July 2015 national convening on the LEAD 
program and praise of the program in a White House blog post, see Roy L. Austin, LEAD-ing the Way to a 
More Efficient Criminal Justice System, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (July 2, 2015), https://obamawhitehous 
e.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/02/lead-ing-way-more-efficient-criminal-justice-system. For a 2018 map 
detailing where in the United States LEAD is being explored, where it is being developed, where it is 
launching, and where it is currently operating, see LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, https://www.lead 
bureau.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
201.  See Anna Roberts, LEAD Us Not into Temptation: A Response to Barbara Fedders’ “Opioid Policing,” 
94 IND. J.L. SUPP. 1, 10 (forthcoming 2019). 
202.  About LEAD, LEAD: LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION (emphasis added), http:// 
leadkingcounty.org/about (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
203.  See supra Subpart I.A. 
204.  See Natapoff, supra note 20, at 1052 (defining the “mens rea requirement” as “the demand that 
in all but a handful of cases, criminal guilt requires inquiry into what the defendant subjectively, actually 
intended at the time of the offense”). 
205.  See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 203 
n.7 (1982) (“Possible bars to conviction include alcoholism, alibi, amnesia, authority to maintain order and 
safety, brainwashing, chromosomal abnormality, consent, convulsion, custodial authority, defense of habita-
tion, defense of others, defense of property, de minimis infraction, diplomatic immunity, domestic (or 
special) responsibility, double jeopardy, duress, entrapment, executive immunity, extreme emotional dis-
turbance, hypnotism, impaired consciousness, impossibility, incompetency, insanity, intoxication (voluntary 
and involuntary), involuntary act defenses, judicial authority, judicial immunity, justification, law enforce-
ment authority, legislative immunity, lesser evils, medical authority, mental illness (apart from insanity), 
military orders (lawful and unlawful), mistake (of law and fact), necessity, official misstatement of law, 
parental authority, plea bargained immunity, provocation, public duty or authority, reflex action, renuncia-
tion, self-defense, somnambulism, the spousal defense to sexual assaults and theft, statute of limitations, 
subnormality, testimonial immunity, the unavailable law defense, unconsciousness, and withdrawal.”). 
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lic206 and sometimes of legal scholars, establishment of an act (or even an as-
sertion thereof) frequently seems to be taken as establishment of a crime. This 
phenomenon may contribute to the tendency to equate an arrest with guilt, 
since the assertion most easily made in support of an arrest is that the defend-
ant committed a particular act. 
One commonly sees the act–crime fusion in public discourse. Thus, for 
example, only some homicides are crimes, and only some criminal homicides 
are murders. It is not unusual, however, for reporting of homicide rates to 
betray the assumption that they are crime rates and indeed to refer to them as 
“murder rates.”207 
One sees this fusion creeping into legal scholarship, too. For example, 
among the various definitions given for “factual guilt,” a popular one assigns 
factual guilt where the defendant “committed the act.”208 It is noteworthy that 
this definition has gained so much currency, given that, in and of itself, com-
mission of the act is typically not enough to establish guilt. It is as if there is a 
concept of crime, for which an act suffices, that is in a constant tussle with 
our societal decision, via statutory law, to say that more is needed.209 
If one looks for explanations of this explanation, one can perhaps specu-
late about the influence of the “innocence movement.” In its first cases, this 
movement focused on situations in which DNA could establish that law en-
forcement had the wrong person.210 The person seeking exoneration was able 
to say, “That wasn’t me,” “I wasn’t there,” or “I didn’t do it.” This became 
the emblematic form of a “wrongful conviction”211 and may have created a 
corollary risk that the conviction of someone who was there and did appear to 
 
206.  See Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1400 (2004) (“For the 
police and the public alike, the problem is explaining that a difference exists between the fact of the bad act 
and the finding of guilt necessary to establish culpability.”). 
207.  See Thomas P. Abt, Opinion, How Not to Respond to the Rising Murder Rate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/opinion/murder-rate-crime.html (discussing, in contrast to 
the headline, the rising homicide rate). 
208.  See, e.g., Genego, supra note 40, at 845 (an individual is “factually guilty” when she “performed a 
given act”); Craig Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Expanding the Zone of Perceived Injustice in 
Death Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 135 (2006) (“[Factual guilt] is the actus reus, the physi-
cal or behavioral component of the criminal act.”); id. at 136 (“[F]actual guilt is what most laypersons mean 
when they talk about whether someone is guilty—or in the case of miscarriages of justice and subsequent 
exonerations, whether an ‘innocent’ person has been wrongly convicted . . . .”); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: 
The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. 
REV. 56, 81 n.84 (1965) (“As used throughout this paper, the term ‘factual guilt’ or more simply ‘guilt’ 
refers to the individual having done the acts which constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
209.  See, for example, the common usage of phrases like “unsolved crimes,” or “unsolved murders.” 
If we were to be true to legal definitions of crimes and murders, there could be no such thing as an un-
solved crime or murder, since it is only in the “solving” that we determine whether there was a “crime” or a 
“murder.” 
210.  See Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges 
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 141 n.62 (2008). 
211.  See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1571. 
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have done something would be assumed to be rightful.212 Thus, the variety 
and potential robustness of all the many ways of saying that I may have done 
the act alleged, but I did not commit a crime, are easily obscured. Larry L. 
Archie, a defense attorney from North Carolina, provoked some chuckles 
when his billboard advertisement—“Just Because You Did It Doesn’t Mean 
You’re Guilty”213—hit social media, with one commentator stating, “That 
can’t be real!”214 But it is real, and his work of reminding us of this reality is 
valuable. 
D. Media Influence 
Media can, of course, both reflect and shape public perceptions.215 When 
media outlets equate an arrest to guilt, they risk reinforcing this fusion. In one 
recent example, a Univision headline stated that “Trump publishes list of 
crimes committed by immigrants: the majority are Latinos who haven’t been 
convicted.”216 This headline provoked at least some pushback, on the basis 
that the list reflected not crimes but arrests.217 
Two recurring media practices seem likely to fuel the fusion of arrest and 
guilt. The first involves the “perp walk,” which is a coordinated effort be-
tween media and police218 in which images of a legally innocent suspect being 
marched from place to place are published, broadcast, or both. Other nations 
find this practice abhorrent,219 as they do our other methods of identifying 
and stigmatizing arrestees.220 
A second example involves the common media practice of reporting the 
 
212.  See, e.g., Rudolf Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of Corroborative Evidence in Due 
Process Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1097, 1127 (2003) (appearing to treat 
being “the right guy” as equivalent to “being criminally guilty”). 
213.  Kevin Underhill, Just Because You Did It . . . , LOWERING THE BAR (Feb. 3, 2015), http://loweri 
ngthebar.net/2015/02/just-because-you-did-it.html. 
214.  Naomi Seu (@NaomiSeu), TWITTER (Nov. 18, 2017, 3:51 PM), https://twitter.com/NaomiS 
eu/status/932033575804862464 (exclaiming, “That can’t be real!” in response to a photograph of the bill-
board). 
215.  See Anna King & Shadd Maruna, The Function of Fiction for a Punitive Public, in CAPTURED BY THE 
MEDIA: PRISON DISCOURSE IN POPULAR CULTURE 16 (Paul Mason ed., 2006) (explaining ways in which 
media constructs punitive public attitudes, which, in turn, encourage punitive constructions of “offenders” 
and increasingly punitive policy approaches). 
216.  See Damià S. Bonmatí & Jorge Cancino, UNIVISION (Mar. 20, 2017, 4:44 PM), https://www.un 
ivision.com/univision-news/immigration/trump-publishes-list-of-alleged-crimes-by-immigrants-the-majorit 
y-are-latinos-who-havent-been-convicted. 
217.  See Pfaff, supra note 187 (“Stop. Calling it. A list. Of crimes. It’s arrests. A cop’s suspicion. 
Maybe a crime, maybe not.”). 
218.  See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
219.  See Murray, supra note 80, at 378. 
220.  See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 194 (2015) (“From an international 
perspective, publicly accessible arrest records are even more exceptional than publicly available conviction 
records.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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content of police accounts as if it were the truth.221 This includes presenting 
police accounts of what suspects are alleged to have said as if those accounts 
were fact,222 despite documented examples of false police claims about what 
suspects are alleged to have said223 and of police mendacity more generally.224 
This media choice echoes, and may fuel, common assumptions about the 
truthfulness and accuracy of police accounts225 and of law enforcement more 
generally.226 If a police account is seen as the truth, and if acts are commonly 
assumed to equal crimes,227 then the police account of an alleged act, which 
can suffice for the purposes of an arrest,228 may also be taken as sufficient to 
establish guilt.229 
E. Self-Comforting 
Assertions and assumptions that serve a self-comforting purpose are 
 
221.  See, e.g., Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media and Criminal 
Defendants, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 95–96 (2008) (“In covering crime stories, journalists typically 
rely on law-enforcement officials’ views, downplaying the defense perspective while minimally acknowledg-
ing the innocence presumption. Thus, news of crime generally exhibits a pro-prosecution bias, rooted most 
importantly in this dependence of reporters on official and, therefore, purportedly credible sources.” (foot-
note omitted)); Adam H. Johnson (@adamjohnsonNYC), TWITTER (Apr. 5, 2018, 8:33 AM), https://twitte 
r.com/adamjohnsonNYC/status/981917661515960322 (appending comment “i see the New York Times 
has mind-readers on staff” to New York Times story headlined “Police Fatally Shoot a Brooklyn Man After 
Falsely Believing He Had a Gun”); Benjamin Mueller & Nate Schweber, Police Fatally Shoot a Brooklyn Man, 
Saying They Thought He Had a Gun, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/nyr 
egion/police-shooting-brooklyn-crown-heights.html (subsequent version of headline). 
222.  See, e.g., Jacobs et al., supra note 77 (“A hate-fueled white supremacist told cops his killing of a 
random black man was merely a practice run for a racist mass murder spree.”); James C. McKinley, Jr., A 
Question Hangs Over a Trial: Why Did a Nanny Kill 2 Children in Her Care?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/11/nyregion/nanny-murder-trial-insanity-defense.html; N.Y. Times 
(@nytimes), TWITTER (Mar. 22, 2017, 3:48 PM), https://twitter.com/nytimes/status/844682114901721 
088 (“A white veteran with a hatred of black men told the police that he killed a homeless man to make a 
statement[.]”). 
223.  See, e.g., Mitchell P. Schwartz, Compensating Victims of Police-Fabricated Confessions, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1119, 1127–30 (2003). 
224.  See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
225.  See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems 
and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 811 (2000) (“[M]ost White Americans believe that 
police officers are the most trustworthy witnesses.”); Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 923, 931 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN 
COURTROOM (1994)); Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel Overcome Pervasive 
Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice System?, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 315, 371 (2012) (“[T]he public . . . too 
readily accepts . . . police judgment without adequate criticism.”). 
226.  See Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 592, 628 (2013) (mentioning empirical indications that jurors put “unjustified stock in the credibility 
of governmental employees”). 
227.  See supra Subpart III.C. 
228.  See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 1526–27. 
229.  See Packer, supra note 42, at 12 (“If there is confidence in the reliability of informal administra-
tive factfinding activities that take place in the early stages of the criminal process, the remain-
ing stages of the process can be relatively perfunctory without any loss in operating efficiency. The pre-
sumption of guilt, as it operates in the Crime Control Model, is the expression of that confidence.”). 
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more likely to prosper than those that do the opposite,230 and they may pros-
per even in the absence of empirical support. Thus, for example, law profes-
sors commonly assert that “law professors have the best job in the world.”231 
In a system in which arrests are disproportionately visited upon poor 
people of color,232 and in which arrests lead to stringent and permanent con-
sequences,233 some of which appear even to judges to resemble “punish-
ment,”234 it might be self-comforting to assume that those arrested are 
guilty.235 (Otherwise, one might have to conclude that we are stymying the life 
 
230.  Daniel Givelber uses the term “ego-syntonic” to capture a similar idea. See Punishing Protestations 
of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1404 (2000). Also relevant is 
the concept of “motivated reasoning,” which “refers to the tendency of people to unconsciously process 
information — including empirical data, oral and written arguments, and even their own brute sensory 
perceptions — to promote goals or interests extrinsic to the decisionmaking task at hand.” Dan M. Kahan, 
Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, The Supreme Court, 2010 
Term, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011). See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 480 (1990). 
231.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Speech: Reimagining Law Schools?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1461, 1462 
(2011) (“Being a law professor is probably the best job on the planet.”); Brad Areheart, Advice on Becoming a 
Law Professor, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN SCH. OF LAW, https://law.utexas.edu/career/pa 
ths/academic/advice-on-becoming-a-law-professor/ (“[T]his is the best job in the world (seriously) . . . .”); 
LawProfBlawg, The 10 Truths of Academia for New Tenure-Track Law Professors, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 14, 
2017), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/02/the-10-truths-of-academia-for-new-tenure-track-law-professors 
(“I have the best job in the world, and so will you.”); Why Law Teaching, NYU SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/acp/why-law-teaching (“I find law teaching and legal academia to be the best job 
in the world . . . .” (quoting NYU Law Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler)); Heather Celeste Mitchell, 
Law by Design: Interview with Professor Sarah Burstein, MS. JD (Feb. 21, 2013), https://ms-jd.org/blog/articl 
e/law-design-interview-professor-sarah-burstein (“Seriously, I have the best job in the world.”); Q&A with 
Outgoing Interim Dean James Gardner, UNIV. AT BUFFALO SCH. OF LAW (June 2017), http://www.law.buff 
alo.edu/links/2017-June/news-gardner.html (“In the long term, I plan simply to resume my former life as a 
UB law professor – just about the best job in the world.”); Richard Westlund, Professor Osamudia James: 
Examining Identity and the Law, UNIV. OF MIAMI SCH. OF LAW (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.law.miami.edu/ 
news/2016/november/professor-osamudia-james-examining-identity-and-law (“I have the best job in the 
world.”). 
232.  See Mayson, supra note 3, at 553. 
233.  See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 1528 (“[W]e should not want arrestees to suffer needless in-
carceration, expensive bail bonds, embarrassing mug shots, possible job loss, and other consequences of 
arrest if their cases will ultimately be dismissed outright without conviction.”); Harmon, supra note 25, at 
312 (“Unlike many other encounters with the police, a suspect who is arrested and booked faces practical, 
reputational, and privacy consequences that persist whether or not he is subject to further legal proceed-
ings.”). 
234.  See supra Subpart II.A. 
235.  JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 241 (1966) (“The negation of the presumption of innocence permeates the entire system of jus-
tice . . . . All involved in the system, the defense attorneys and judges, as well as the prosecutors and po-
licemen, operate according to a working presumption of the guilt of persons accused of crime.”); Roberts, 
supra note 110, at 2017 (“[E]ven at the trial stage, to raise the specter of innocence is to make uncomforta-
ble suggestions: not only that law enforcement (both police and prosecution) has made costly mistakes, and 
that out beyond the courthouse a factually guilty person may be enjoying freedom, but also that an innocent 
person’s life has been harmed or ruined in all the ways that pre-adjudication process can achieve.” (footnote 
omitted)). The point suggested in the text is particularly the case if one is less concerned about hardships 
when they fall on those believed to be guilty. Cf. Radley Balko, Opinion, The Case for Releasing Violent Offend-
ers, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/08/14/the 
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chances of, stigmatizing, and stripping away the liberty of people on the basis 
of their race and poverty.)236 If a desire to self-comfort is indeed operative, 
then perhaps those people who are erased from the common plea-bargaining 
statistical error—people whose cases ended without a finding of guilt—are 
erased because dwelling on their existence and numerosity is troubling. Simi-
larly, a view of the police that associates them with truthfulness and accuracy 
may be more comforting than the opposite.237 A view of arrests as acts of the 
suspect,238 and thus within the suspect’s control, may be more comforting 
than the view of arrest as a threat that may be incentivized by factors other 
than evidence,239 and that may be visited upon you no matter how you be-
have. 
An additional self-comforting assumption that might be at play is the as-
sumption that there exists a clean binary of “guilty” and “innocent,” “offend-
er” and “not an offender.” Under this binary, guilt is revealed by conduct—
the arrest—and thus it exists before the lawyering begins and is not subject to 
the vagaries of resources or skill. It would be—for some, it is—highly disturb-
ing that one’s chances of being found legally guilty are deeply influenced by 
the quality (and often the resources) of one’s defense counsel.240 It may also 
be unsettling to acknowledge that in some cases factual guilt does not exist in 
a definitive sense,241 and that the only real answer one can get on that question 
is what a factfinder concludes (thus again implicating the quality/resources 
differential). Some may be tempted to substitute this “maybe-maybe not” or 
“let’s see what your lawyer can do with that” world—a world in tension with 
the Supreme Court’s declaration that “[t]here can be no equal justice where 
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has”242—for 
a world of a nice, clean binary, in which it is not money, chance, or legal skill 
 
-case-for-releasing-violent-offenders/?utm_term=.bc9b2f5f97cf (“We want to punish criminals. We want 
them to suffer. We create hostile prison environments rife with violence, racial resentment and rape.”). 
236.  See Packer, supra note 42, at 19 (“[In] the system as it operates, the relative financial inability of 
most persons accused of crime sharply distinguishes their treatment from the small minority of the finan-
cially capable.”). 
237.  See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1741 (1993). 
238.  See O’Neill et al., supra note 56, at 268 (“[T]he existence of an arrest indicates some familiarity 
with the criminal justice system on the part of the arrestee[,] . . . [and] familiarity with the criminal justice 
system may bear a role in assessing culpability.”); Myrna S. Raeder et al., Convicting the Guilty, Acquitting the 
Innocent: Recently Adopted ABA Policies, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14, 19 (2006) (referring to Givelber’s assertion that 
there is a “‘core belief [shared] by virtually all personnel who work within the criminal justice system’ that 
anyone arrested is guilty,” and asserting that it stems in part from a tendency to “believe in a just world” 
(quoting Givelber, supra note 34, at 1329)). 
239.  See supra notes 23–35 and accompanying text. 
240.  See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect 
of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 159 (2012) (a lot). 
241.  See supra Subpart I.A. 
242.  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
ROBERTSFINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  8:00 PM 
1022 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4:987 
that determines your guilt, but rather your misconduct, embodied by your 
arrest.243 
IV. WHY THIS MATTERS 
There are various reasons why one might be concerned by a fusion of ar-
rest and guilt.244 This Article highlights just one set of such reasons, selected 
because of the breadth of its impact. It focuses on a variety of components of 
our criminal legal system that require urgent reform, and as regards to which 
the slowness of reform may be a puzzle.245 It posits that reform in these areas 
requires a robust understanding of the difference between arrest and guilt, and 
that the depth and breadth of those concepts’ fusion might provide at least a 
partial explanation of the obstacles to reform. 
A. Defense Representation 
If guilt is commonly seen as something revealed by an arrest—if, in other 
words, the relevance of the entire part of the criminal process between arrest 
and adjudication has fallen out,246 and if the law is viewed less as a means by 
which guilt can be constructed and more as a construct that can be used by 
defense attorneys to “get their clients off”247—a variety of failings in the area 
 
243.  See Erin Murphy, Indigent Defense, CHAMPION, Feb. 2002, at 33, 33 (“In the short time that I 
have been a public defender, I have learned that most people who ask the ‘how can you’ question have 
already divided the world into neat categories of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ They assume that ‘those people’ are in fact 
guilty criminals and therefore undeserving of constitutional protections. Sometimes the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ 
is simply the speaker’s distinction between the lawless and the lawful, the good citizen and the bad. Often 
race or economic privilege bolsters the speaker’s confidence that he or she will always be counted among 
the ‘us.’ Regardless of how the division is justified, however, the ‘them’ is always a group to which the 
speaker cannot relate, or to which the speaker is confident he or she will never belong. It is also always a 
group comprised only of the guilty — as though our laws and procedures were just impediments to the 
efficient adjudication of guilt, rather than the engine through which we determine whether guilt exists at 
all.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT 
DEFENSE 2000: REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE vii (2000) (“In the end, a good lawyer is 
the best defense against wrongful conviction . . . .”). 
244.  See supra Subpart II.B, for example, for the many potential effects of recidivism calculations 
that are maximized through the choice to use arrest as a metric. 
245.  See Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third Generation of Wrong-
ful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 1230 (2005) (“The rules and structures of 
which I speak—indigent defense systems, prosecutorial incentive structures, plea bargaining procedures, 
docket control mechanisms, etc.—are over-determined candidates for reform campaigns in that they both 
impose unfairness up front in all criminal cases and lead to the incarceration of innocents on the back 
end.”). 
246.  See Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History, 86 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 697, 725–26 (2017) (highlighting the thinness of the center of criminal, as compared to civil, proce-
dure). 
247.  Entman & Gross, supra note 221, at 96 n.8 (“The defense attorneys, the contending side, are 
likely viewed as more biased than prosecutors—their job is to try to get their clients off—and thus their 
claims are likely to be viewed more skeptically.”). 
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of defense representation may become less surprising. These include govern-
ment-funded defense resources,248 the standards and policing of attorney per-
formance,249 the incentive structures operating on defense attorneys,250 de-
fender caseloads,251 and—resulting from these—the inability of defense 
attorneys to meet their ethical obligations.252 James Forman Jr. has comment-
ed on the apparent tension between the dire state of public defense and the 
“scant attention” focused on it in some quarters.253 A fusion of arrest and 
guilt may make the phenomenon that he notes more understandable because 
if factual guilt is viewed as something established by arrest, then many or all of 
the functions of defense counsel may be seen as a waste of money. Who 
wants to support those who are trying to get people off on a technicality?254 
 
248.  See James Forman Jr., Opinion, Justice Springs Eternal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/opinion/sunday/justice-springs-eternal.html?smprod=nytcore-iph 
one&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=1 (“[N]o aspect of our criminal justice system is as overworked and 
underfunded as public defender services. Of the more than $200 billion that states and local governments 
spend on criminal justice each year, less than 2 percent goes to public defense. Yet improving indigent 
defense gets scant attention in the conversation about how to fix our criminal justice system.”); see also 
Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 293, 311 (2002) (“Judges are not likely to order the expenditure of funds to hire lawyers and 
support staff when convinced of guilt and worried that additional support will only slow the process of 
adjudication not change results.”). 
249.  See Bernhard, supra note 248, at 311 (“[C]ourts may have been dissuaded from taking action [on 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel claims] by the unacknowledged but pervasive belief that anyone who has 
been arrested is guilty—a belief which inevitably minimizes the significance of all else in the criminal justice 
system besides the swift resolution of cases. The presumption of guilt is a ‘core belief shared by virtually all 
personnel who work within the criminal justice system’ and a major hindrance to improving criminal de-
fense services. If judges suspect that everyone arrested is guilty, it is hard to convince them to strike as 
unconstitutional state-funded criminal defense systems that rush pleas or discourage legal research and 
creative investigation.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Givelber, supra note 34, at 1329)); id. at 312 (“The 
presumption of guilt helps to explain why the Supreme Court formulated an almost insurmountable stand-
ard of review for ineffective assistance claims on appeal.”); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration 
or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 739, 741–42 (describing assistance of counsel as often involving 
“little more than counsel’s help in facilitating a guilty plea”). 
250.  For defense attorney incentives in our system that militate in favor of performing the “mini-
mum amount necessary to convince clients to plead guilty as quickly as possible,” see Tigran W. Eldred, 
Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 
333, 351 (2012). 
251.  See Peter A. Joy, Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 205, 215–16 
(2011) (“The Strickland standard and the ‘guilty anyway’ syndrome combine to produce a criminal justice 
system that accepts excessive caseloads resulting in poor lawyering.”). 
252.  See Eldred, supra note 250, at 335 (“[U]nderfunded and overworked public defenders ‘are con-
stantly forced to violate their oaths as attorneys because their caseloads make it impossible for them to 
practice law as they are required to do according to the profession’s rules. They cannot interview their 
clients properly, effectively seek their pretrial release, file appropriate motions, conduct necessary fact inves-
tigations, negotiate responsibly with the prosecutor, adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless 
other tasks that normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with sufficient time and resources.’” (quoting 
NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf)); Irene 
Oritseweyinmi Joe, Systematizing Public Defender Rationing, 93 DENV. L. REV. 389, 396 (2016). 
253.  Forman, supra note 248. 
254.  See Jodi F. Bouer & Elizabeth Ortecho, Book Review, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 377, 378 (1996) 
(“Rothwax does not view the defense attorney’s role as any better than the defendant’s since she also serves 
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Who wants to fund smoke and mirrors?255 
To the extent that problems exist with defense lawyering that are within 
defense attorneys’ power to ameliorate, the fusion may again have some ex-
planatory weight. Thus, Abbe Smith finds that attorneys’ assumptions of guilt 
underlie “the bad lawyering at the root of many wrongful convictions: feckless 
or beleaguered lawyers feeling that their client is guilty anyway, so what the 
hell?”256 
A final example concerns the very provision of defense counsel. To some, 
the failure to provide defense counsel at stages of the criminal process that 
include arraignment257—and during the guilty plea process that arraignment 
may encompass258—is a disgrace.259 But those who fuse arrest with guilt may 
reject the idea that defense counsel needs to be provided at such points.260 
And, where defense counsel is provided, those who fuse arrest and guilt may 
view the model of “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” not as a monstrosity but rather 
 
to prevent, distort, and mislead the court from discovering the truth, i.e., her client’s guilt.”) (reviewing 
JUDGE HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996)). 
255.  See Michael J. Minerva, Letter, Court Funding, in THE FLA. BAR, SEPTEMBER 1, 2008 LETTERS 
(2008), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/letters-28/ (“Sen. Victor Crist, R-Tampa, decries 
the proposed moratorium [by public defenders on taking new cases, as a response to a funding crisis] as 
grandstanding, saying along the way that most defendants are guilty anyway. No wonder public defenders 
lack adequate funds when that highly placed legislator has such an outlandish view of the defense func-
tion.”); Raeder et al., supra note 238, at 19 (“Governments thus view defense services as perhaps necessary 
evils, but evils nevertheless, leading to cost control as the bureaucracy’s overriding concern. After all, [the 
logic appears to go,] why pay high fees to protect the guilty?”); John P. Gross & Jerry J. Cox, The Cost of 
Representation Compared to the Cost of Incarceration, CHAMPION, Mar. 2013, at 22, 22 (“The reluctance to ade-
quately fund indigent defense is undoubtedly based on an unwillingness to spend money on attorneys to 
represent defendants who are perceived as most likely guilty. Providing defendants with representation is 
therefore seen as a waste of money; attorneys will only delay the inevitable and will make the criminal jus-
tice system less efficient.”). See generally Murphy, supra note 243. 
256.  Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety About Inno-
cence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 327 (2009); see also Rapping, supra note 111, at 1020 
(“[T]hrough their subconscious assumptions about their clients, what the evidence against them means, and 
what consequences are appropriate, defenders can be pushed to accept a lower standard of justice, and to 
fight a little less aggressively, for their clients of color.”). 
257.  See Packer, supra note 42, at 51 (“The assistance of counsel, to the extent that it is available at 
arraignment, is perfunctory in the majority of cases. Waiver is easily accomplished and widespread.”). 
258.  See id. at 48; cf. Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 387–
88 (2011). 
259.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR 
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 17 
(2009). 
260.  See Packer, supra note 42, at 48 (“[According to the Crime Control Model,] [t]he general run of 
criminal defendants are capable of making up their own minds as to whether they want to plead guilty. If a 
defendant has a lawyer and wants to consult him about the guilty plea, that is proper. But the state should 
be under no obligation to provide counsel for a defendant at arraignment. All that is required for a plea of 
guilty is that the defendant understand its nature and consequences in a general kind of way, and that he 
enter it of his own free will. The judge’s duty is to ensure that these conditions are met. It would involve a 
needless duplication of resources to insist that a defense lawyer as well as a judge must participate in the 
entry of a guilty plea.”); id. at 61 (“The criminal process as it actually operates in the large majority of cases 
probably approximates fairly closely the dictates of the Crime Control Model.”). 
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as an efficient way of proceeding.261 The phrase nicely encapsulates a system 
in which the period between arrest and adjudication is largely seen as pointless 
filler,262 and thus one in which a lack of funding and support for vigorous de-
fense becomes understandable. 
B. Preadjudication Suffering 
Preadjudication practices, such as bail, seem finally to be getting broad 
recognition as practices that not only resemble the “punishment” that is for-
bidden in advance of conviction but specifically punishment for the crime of 
poverty.263 But it took a long time.264 
If one is searching for explanations of how preadjudication practices of 
this nature have gone on so long and to such adverse effect,265 it may again be 
worth considering the assumptions of guilt attaching to those arrested. Jeffrey 
Manns, for example, notes that the “conventional wisdom of the culpability of 
anyone that the government has probable cause to arrest goes far towards 
explaining popular apathy to pretrial detentions and the dearth of remedies for 
detainees who are not convicted.”266 This apathy makes sense if, as R.A. Duff 
suggests, “the defendant is seen as being in fact an offender, who awaits only 
the formal verdict of the court before receiving the punishment he de-
serves.”267 And indeed, if punishment is deserved, one might as well get start-
ed as soon as possible,268 something that our system permits by folding “time 
 
261.  For the notion that the criminal justice system in America is “plagued by a . . . ‘meet ‘em and 
plead ‘em’ methodology,” see Lahny R. Silva, Right to Counsel and Plea Bargaining: Gideon’s Legacy Continues, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 2219, 2230 (2014) (footnote omitted). 
262.  See Meyn, supra note 246, at 725–26. 
263.  See, e.g., Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Poverty’s Punishment: America’s Oppressive Bail Regime, AM. PROSPECT 
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://prospect.org/article/poverty%E2%80%99s-punishment-america%E2%80%99s-o 
ppressive-bail-regime. 
264.  See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 839–
40. 
265.  See Simonson, supra note 89, at 608 (“Even a few days in jail are profoundly destabilizing: de-
fendants experience declines in physical and mental health, and potentially lose wages, jobs, stable housing, 
and custody of their children.”). 
266.  Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1947, 1956 (2005). 
267.  Duff, supra note 128, at 120 (adding that “that is why it is so easy (and so revealing) to slide into 
talking about the danger that the defendant will commit, not [‘offenses,’] but ‘further offen[s]es’ while on 
bail”). 
268.  See id. at 119 (“Now pre-trial detention is not (formally) punishment; it does not presuppose 
that the defendant is guilty of the crime for which he is to be tried (although if the defendant is convicted 
and sentenced to imprisonment, time spent on pre-trial remand can be counted towards that sentence as 
‘time served’).”); Packer, supra note 42, at 39 (“[Under the Crime Control Model,] [t]he vast majority of 
persons charged with crime are factually guilty[,] . . . [and] [f]or all practical purposes, the defendant is a 
criminal. Just because the assembly line cannot move fast enough for him to be immediately disposed of is 
no reason for him to go free. If he does go free, he may not appear for trial, a risk that is heightened when 
he has a strong consciousness of guilt and a lively expectation of probable punishment.”). 
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served” into the formal sentence.269 As Human Rights Watch puts it, “[t]he 
time in pretrial detention (as well as in police lockup pre-arraignment)” can 
serve as “punishment paid in advance.”270 
A lack of concern about pretrial custody has ripple effects. Part of what 
justifies speedy trial guarantees is that a limit on the time spent to bring a case 
to trial necessarily means a temporal limit on pretrial custody.271 If those held 
in custody are assumed to be guilty, then we can see an explanation for the 
widespread failure to make speedy trial guarantees meaningful.272 Similarly, 
while one might be concerned that pretrial custody helps to bring about 
pleas,273 if one assumes that those in custody are guilty, then that may appear 
to be not coercion but welcome efficiency.274 
C. Police Reform 
If the kinds of assumptions mentioned in this Article—that arrests are 
tantamount to guilt, that police are truthful, and that police are essential as the 
primary mechanism for bringing the guilty to light—are indeed widespread, 
then it may be unsurprising how halting reform has been of policing prob-
lems, including racially disparate policing and arrests,275 widespread use of 
arrest,276 inappropriate incentives to arrest,277 police untruth,278 and the incen-
 
269.  See Duff, supra note 128, at 119. 
270.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF 
LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 30 (2010), https://www.hrw.org/sites 
/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf. 
271.  See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). 
272.  See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser & James C. McKinley Jr., Chronic Bronx Court Delays Deny Defendants 
Due Process, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/nyregion/chroni 
c-bronx-court-delays-deny-defendants-due-process-suit-says.html. 
273.  See Packer, supra note 42, at 39–40. 
274.  See id. at 38 (“[A] decision that the defendant will remain in custody once he has been charged 
may itself induce him to plead guilty, thereby short-circuiting the part of the process concerned with guilt 
determination and moving directly to the question of ultimate disposition.”); id. at 39–40 (explaining the 
antipathy of the “Crime Control Model” to reducing the rate of pretrial confinement: “The main risk is that 
the increased consumption of time required to litigate cases that do not really need to be litigated would put 
an intolerable strain on what is already an overburdened process. That consideration alone argues against a 
policy that makes pretrial liberty the norm.”). 
275.  See Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 
49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 498 (2011) (using a meta-analysis to reach the conclusion that, “[o]n average, the 
chances of a minority suspect being arrested were found to be 30 percent greater than a White suspect”); 
Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 173 (2014) 
(“Black men are arrested at younger ages and more often than white men for reasons that have as much to 
do with racially differentiated exercises of police discretion as with racial differences in offending behavior. 
Racial profiling by the police targets blacks and Hispanics and exposes them proportionately more often 
than whites to arrest. Police drug enforcement policies target substances that black drug dealers sell and 
places where they sell them, resulting in rates of arrests for drug offenses that have been four to six times 
higher for blacks than for whites since the mid-1980s.”). 
276.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
277.  See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
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tives and culture that may encourage that untruth.279 If arrests are seen as tan-
tamount to guilt, then those who bear the burden of making arrests—and 
thus of taking control of criminal wrongdoers—are likely to garner esteem 
and protection. The fusion of arrest and guilt thus may act as an obstacle to 
reform. Judges, for example, play a role in overseeing police conduct and tes-
timony. But Rodney Uphoff and others have suggested that judicial assump-
tions of guilt may dilute that power.280 
This Article also suggests that traveling along with an assumption that an 
arrest equals guilt is an assumption that a lack of arrest equals a lack of guilt.281 
(It can be hard to make much sense of “recidivism rates” that rely on arrests, 
or “crime rates” that rely on arrest rates,282 unless this second assumption is in 
 
278.  See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
279.  See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 27. 
280.  See Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants, Their Lawyers and the 
Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L.J. 521, 543–44 (2007) (“In my view, the attitudinal blinders that many judges 
possess contribute significantly to the inadequacies of the criminal justice system. Most judges, especially 
those with prosecutorial experience, presume that most defendants are, in fact, guilty, even though some 
are, in fact, innocent. This presumption of guilt, pro-prosecution perspective not only affects the manner in 
which many judges rule on motions, evaluate witnesses, and exercise their discretion, but it also adversely 
affects the willingness of many judges to police law enforcement agents and prosecutors. Judges tolerate 
sloppy police work because they do not want to be viewed as micro-managing the police. Judicial reluctance 
to let the guilty go free has meant a decreased use of the exclusionary rule. Similarly, courts are hesitant to 
dismiss cases because of Brady violations or take other steps to reign in [sic] prosecutorial misconduct. 
Finally, even when courts find error, too many errors are deemed harmless. The expanded use of harmless 
error not only allows questionable verdicts to stand, it does little to discourage misconduct and sloppy 
practices in the administration of justice.” (footnotes omitted)); Bowers, supra note 22, at 1163 (“[T]here are 
strong reasons to doubt the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in policing the police. Judges are especially 
loath to discredit even incredible police testimony if it means razing evidence against defendants—
especially recidivist defendants—whom judges may already believe are wasting judicial resources by not plea 
bargaining.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before 
Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 764 (1999) (suggesting that the fact that 
“many judges believe that most defendants are guilty” provides one of five reasons why judges are “all too 
willing to ignore police perjury”). 
281.  Cf., e.g., Petersilia, supra note 91, at 382 (“[C]riminal activity in the general population is assumed 
to be relatively rare.”). 
282.  See Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Deterrence, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 55, 60 (2001) (“[W]e have no direct measure of the crime rate, but must rely on either the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR”) or the National Crime Victimization 
Surveys (“NCVS”). The UCR only shows reported crimes and the NCVS is dependent upon the memory 
of the individuals surveyed and the method of questioning.”); Jerome G. Miller, From Social Safety Net to 
Dragnet: African American Males in the Criminal Justice System, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 481 (1994) 
(“Meanwhile, the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), upon which the media routinely base their official esti-
mates of crime, inflated both the numbers and the seriousness of the types of incidents reported. Whereas 
most European nations report their crime statistics on the basis of convictions, the UCR reports are based 
on complaints or arrests. However, about thirty-eight of every one hundred individuals arrested for a felony 
either were not prosecuted or had their cases dismissed outright at their first court appearances. This had 
nothing to do with plea bargains; usually there was not sufficient reason to proceed with the cases.” (foot-
note omitted)). For spillover effects of these choices, see, for example, Tess Owen & Isabella McKinley 
Corbo, When Cops Commit Crimes: Inside the First Database that Tracks America’s Criminal Cops, VICE NEWS 
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://news.vice.com/story/police-crime-database, for a discussion of the use of police 
arrests to populate a database of police “crime”: “We should also bear in mind that an arrest is not equiva-
lent to a conviction. Just as with the general population, officers are presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
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play.283) This second assumption may serve to insulate the police from con-
cerns about disparate enforcement, since it may mean that potential concern 
about failure to arrest is diluted,284 just as is potential concern about decisions to 
arrest. 
D. Prosecutorial Reform 
Commentators frequently lament a widespread failure by prosecutors to 
put much meaning into their constitutional and ethical mandate to “do jus-
tice.”285 This mandate all too often seems to be interpreted as a mandate to 
score convictions—in direct contravention of the Supreme Court’s indication 
in Berger v. United States that the interest of the prosecution “is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done.”286 Paul Butler describes this state-
ment, in the current system, as “just words on paper”;287 others despair of the 
idea that the “do justice” mandate can ever be made meaningful.288 One 
would need, for example, to set up an appropriate incentive system for prose-
cutors, and that has not yet been done.289 
An assumption regarding the guilt of those arrested may help elucidate 
some of these failures.290 If those arrested are assumed to be guilty, then (for 
 
But Stinson [the creator of a ‘police crime database’] thinks looking at arrests is a fair way to examine cop 
crime, because that’s how law enforcement (including the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report) collects infor-
mation on crime in general.” Id. 
283.  See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563 (2014) (discussing the 
question of whether a criminal record is not just a reliable indicator of culpability but also a reliable indica-
tor of relative culpability). 
284.  See I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1252–54 (2017) (dis-
cussing “underenforcement”); see also I. Bennett Capers, The Under-Policed, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589 
(2016). 
285.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-
1.2(b) (4th ed. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunct 
ionFourthEdition/ (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, 
not merely to convict.”). 
286.  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
287.  Paul Butler, Opinion, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2013), https://www.nytim 
es.com/2013/03/18/opinion/gideons-muted-trumpet.html. 
288.  See, e.g., State v. Starrish, 544 P.2d 1, 9 (Wash. 1975) (Utter, J., dissenting). 
289.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2089, 2091 (2010) (“[C]onvictions are the lodestar by which prosecutors tend to be judged.”); Andrew D. 
Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1328 (2000) (“[E]ven in the 
absence of bad faith prosecutors have incentives to resolve nagging doubts about a suspect’s guilt in favor 
of prosecution.”); Siegel, supra note 245, at 1225 (noting “the failure of our system to develop an incentive 
structure for prosecutors that rewards the pursuit of justice rather than the pursuit of competitive ad-
vantage”). 
290.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 270, at 31 (quoting Timothy Murray, then-Executive 
Director of the Pretrial Justice Institute, as saying that woven into the mindset of prosecutors across this 
country is “the idea [that] you should somehow ‘pay’ from the moment of arrest, that you owe the system 
something just by virtue of being accused . . . because they implicitly believe—and must believe—that 
people who are arrested are guilty”). 
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those who believe that guilt should be met with a conviction) justice might 
well be seen as identical to the pursuit of convictions, and incentives that fur-
ther that pursuit might be seen as beneficial. In addition, if those arrested are 
assumed to be guilty, then concerns about prosecutorial misconduct are likely 
to lessen, given the tendency to worry less about misconduct when its victim 
is thought to be guilty.291 
Judges have a potential role in overseeing aspects of the prosecutorial role 
and curbing its worst excesses.292 But if they too are liable to fuse arrest with 
guilt, their relative inaction may make more sense.293 Prosecutors, in turn, 
have a potential role in overseeing aspects of police conduct, screening its 
output,294 and curbing its worst excesses.295 If they are liable to fuse arrest 
with guilt,296 their relative failure to play this role may make more sense.297 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal justice reform is hard. However strong one’s commitment, one 
faces obvious barriers, whether fear, financing, or resistance to change. This 
Article has brought to light a less obvious barrier: a widespread fusion of ar-
rest and guilt. If even those committed to criminal justice reform are vulnera-
ble to this fusion, the slowness of reform in areas that rely on a robust under-
standing of the distinction between arrest and guilt may make more sense. 
Yet criminal justice reform is crucial. If, as this Article suggests, the fusion 
of arrest and guilt is indeed a potent force, we must investigate its many pos-
 
291.  See Balko, supra note 235 (“We want to punish criminals. We want them to suffer. We create 
hostile prison environments rife with violence, racial resentment and rape.”). 
292.  See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 67, at 331 (suggesting that judicial power to monitor and regulate 
prosecutorial conduct is greater than commonly suggested). 
293.  See Uphoff, supra note 280, at 543–44, 544 n.129 (“Many commentators have highlighted the 
serious systemic problem of prosecutorial misconduct and criticized judicial inattention to the prob-
lem . . . .”). 
294.  See NYU Sch. of Law, New Frontiers in Race and Criminal Justice – Panel 2: Race and Prosecution, 
YOUTUBE 29:58–31:07 (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUtgqDaJN_g#t=29m58s 
(showing Whitney Tymas saying: “[P]rosecutors need to understand the real leadership that they can exer-
cise when it comes to not endorsing all police action. . . . [I]t’s really okay to tell a police officer, ‘I’m not . . . 
prosecuting this case.’ . . . [P]rosecutors can say no and . . . not just be case processors—really be lead-
ers . . . .”). 
295.  See id. 
296.  See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 125, 140 (2004) (“The perception, even among prosecutors, that the police only arrest guilty 
people in the first place reinforces the belief that the right person was charged and later convicted.”). 
297.  See Natapoff, supra note 20, at 1068 (“With respect to minor offenses, . . . prosecutors in some 
jurisdictions forgo the screening inquiry and convert arrests into charges more or less automatically. This 
fact is reflected in low rates at which prosecutors decline cases. In New York and Iowa, for example, Josh 
Bowers found declination rates for certain minor offenses as low as 2% or less, meaning that 98% of those 
police arrest decisions converted to criminal charges. A Vera Institute study found similarly low prosecuto-
rial declination rates in misdemeanor drug cases in North Carolina.” (footnote omitted)). 
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sible explanations. Identifying the fusion, and attempting to understand it, is a 
necessary precursor to efforts to combat it.  
 
